



AN INTERNATIONAL PEOPLE'S TRIBUNAL

Witness Name: Muetter Iliqud		
Witness category:	fact <input type="checkbox"/>	expert <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Date of testimony: 12 September 2021		
Link to recording*: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tFkr3pC1BmI&t=20235s		
Time stamp (start/end): 00:14:25 – 01:17:55		
Report included:	yes <input type="checkbox"/>	no <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Statement included:	yes <input type="checkbox"/>	no <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Transcript included:	yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	no <input type="checkbox"/>
Presentation included:	yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	no <input type="checkbox"/>

*Please note that all recordings of the Uyghur Tribunal hearings can be found on You Tube: [Uyghur Tribunal - YouTube](#)

Uyghur Tribunal submission by Adiljan Abdurehim and Muetter Iliqud

August 2021

Note for September hearing

- 1) Satellite image analysis: satellite imagery expert approach generally; as well as the satellite imagery analysis used regarding the camp system and gauging the number of people interned and people possibly subject to alleged crimes.

The UTJD is aimed to study China's systematic crackdown campaign in East Turkistan, the team is conducting comprehensive research on each individual detention facility compiled with detailed information, preparing a fundamental data set to study China's camp system.

The primary objectives of the UTJDs present study are: i) To present a multi-temporal map of each detention facility with attribute table of additional information, matching various pieces of documentary evidence with satellite imagery; ii) To build a database with comprehensive information; iii) Provide a quantitative analysis of the detention facility and an assessment on the spatiotemporal changes of the different type of detention facility.

Over the past three years, our researchers have identified and mapped more than 530 suspected detention facilities, including 232 suspected "Re-education Camps" construction sites, 257 Prisons, and more than 152 Bingtuan Laogai detention facilities (reform through labor camps) in East Turkistan. In recent months, we have been working hard to build a database of detention facilities.

On the September hearing, UTJD shall give an explanation of the satellite imagery analysis used regarding the camp system, including detailed description of methodology; present an estimation on the number of people interned based on satellite analysis; describe the security level analysis of the detention facilities by explaining the symbolic features visible on the satellite images.

- 2) Research methodology by Uyghur Transitional Justice Database & other collaborators: provide a more detailed account of the UTJDs methodology and research guidelines for local volunteers conducting interviews.
 - Open-source information: information that is publicly available on various social media platforms,
 - Media reportage and leaked government records and documents: extensive reportage carried out by various credible news outlets, both on-the-ground reporting and their investigative journalism
 - UTJD online registration form
 - Telecommunications: interviews carried out via skypes or telephone calls (explain the interview guidelines)

- Face to face interviews
- Data collection on paper
- Satellite data

Uyghur Transitional Justice Database Annual Report 2021

The Uyghur Transitional Justice Database (UTJD) is an ongoing project that focuses on the registration of the disappeared and extrajudicially interned Uyghurs in East Turkistan. The present report introduces various set of data collected by the UTJD, aiming to serve the information needs of the growing community of organizations, UN and government officials, and other concerned individuals who are devoted to seeking accountability for human rights violations against the Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples in East Turkistan.



Where are they? - Demonstration in Oslo arranged by the Norwegian Uyghur Committee.

The persecution of Uyghurs in East Turkistan

Second edition



This present Report is not a final version, but a preliminary version. The numbers/stats presented in this document may differ.

**Annual Report
June 2021**

About The Norwegian Uyghur Committee (NUC)

The Norwegian Uyghur Committee (NUC) is an NGO based in Ski, Norway, founded by the Uyghur diaspora community in Norway in 2003. NUC aims to hold the Chinese regime accountable for its gross human rights violations in East Turkistan (aka. Xinjiang) and to advocate justice for the victims. We collaborate with the World Uyghur Congress in pursuit of accountability for mass atrocities perpetrated against the Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities in East Turkistan.

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Picture

Photo taken for the Norwegian Uyghur Committee by Ibrahim Orkash.

The Norwegian Uyghur Committee

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Acknowledgements

This project is made possible through funding from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The research contained in this report would not have been possible without advice, assistance and technical support from a number of individuals.

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We would also like to extend our thanks to those who have advised and supported our work in the course of this project. We are grateful to the testifiers for their trust in us.

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Abstract

Uyghur Transitional Justice Database (UTJD) is an ongoing project that focuses on the registration of the disappeared and extrajudicially interned Uyghurs in East Turkistan. This project is made possible through funding from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). We are building a comprehensive database to document the ongoing atrocities being committed by the Chinese Communist Party toward the Uyghurs other turkic population since the revision of its legislation in 2017 (amended Oct. 9, 2018) to “allow” local governments to “educate and transform” people influenced by extremism at so-called “vocational training centers”, also effectively known as concentration camps by their extrajudicial nature in East Turkistan (aka. Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR)). This report examines the urgent reality of East Turkistan by analyzing data from the UTJD database.

Introduction

The Chinese regime's Han¹-ethnocentric sinicization policies have been exceedingly inflicted on Uyghurs² and other Turkic minorities in the past few years in East Turkistan, a region in eastern Central Asia in present-day China. It is also known by its Chinese name Xinjiang³ ('New Dominion/Territory').

In this report, the referential term 'East Turkistan' will be used instead of 'Xinjiang', and the reason for this is threefold: 1. On the basis of a widespread preference among Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples in the diaspora communities; 2. There were two short-lived independent republics before the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC): Turkish-Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan (1933-34); East Turkistan Republic (1944-49); 3. The use of the referential term 'East Turkistan' (with different spellings: Eastern Turkestan, Eastern Turkistan, East Turkestan) in historical academic journal records (Prichard 1839, 196; Huttmann 1844, 126; Colquhoun 1900, 20537) has also been taken into account on this matter.

The Chinese regime, with the aim of upholding total control and achieving unquestioning submission in East Turkistan, has been actively executing its coercive ethnocentric sinicization policies to erase Uyghurs' Turkic identity (i.e. language, culture, and the belief system). These specifically targeted assimilation policies have had an enormous impact on the social interactions and the collective psyche of the Uyghur people both at home and abroad, which in recent years also started to impact the lives of other Turkic/Muslim peoples in East Turkistan.

Since 2017, a great deal of news reports and a growing number of research papers have been published, documenting and addressing the human rights violations committed and continue to be committed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) against the Turkic peoples as well as Hui Muslims. Among these human rights violations in East Turkistan, the establishment of the extrajudicial internment camps has been the most prominent over the last couple of years, which have been disguisedly referred to as "re-education" / "vocational training" centers by the Chinese regime. In the subsequent section the Camp System, the very nature and the various types of these internment camps will be further elaborated.

¹ There are 56 officially recognized ethnic groups in China, and ethnic Han Chinese accounts for 92% of the overall population.

² The largest Turkic speaking ethnic group in East Turkestan, predominantly Muslim.

³ The full Chinese official name was given in 1955: Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

The persecution of Uyghurs in East Turkistan

The present report is aiming to serve the information needs of the growing community of organizations, UN and government officials, and other concerned individuals who are devoted to seeking accountability for human rights violations against the Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples in East Turkistan.

The historical background of East Turkistan

East Turkistan is geographically situated on the northwestern frontier of present-day China, bordering a number of Central-Asian countries, and in addition with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India to its west, Russia to its north, and Mongolia to its northeast. It spans some 2000 kilometers from east to west and some 1650 kilometers from north to south, which amounts to circa 1.7 million square kilometers (almost four times the size of the state of California).

The Uyghur population was over three million in 1947 (Millward 2009a, 275), 3.64 million in 1953 census (Lal 1970, 5), around 6 million in 1982 (Gladney 1990, 3), and it increased to somewhere around 12 million in 2015, according to the Statistic Bureau of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (2017).

Uighurs are indigenous people who have lived in this area for thousands of years, with Indo-European and Turkish ancestries. The history of the Uighurs dates back to more than 4,000 years, several independent states have been established throughout their long history. The history, culture, language, and identity of the Uighurs have little in common with the Han-Chinese, in common to the other Turkic people of Central Asia, Uighurs believed earlier in their history in shamanism and Buddhism. From the first century AD, until Islam began to make its impact, East Turkestan was one of the major centers of Buddhist civilization (Millward 2007).

Under Manchu Qing Empire (1959 - 1911)

The independent Uyghur Kingdom in East Turkistan — the Seyyid Kingdom, also known as Yarkent Kingdom — was invaded by the Manchu rulers of China in 1759 who annexed East Turkistan into their empire. The Manchus ruled East Turkistan as a military colony from 1759 to 1862. During this period, the Uyghurs and other peoples of East Turkistan valiantly opposed the foreign rule in their land. They revolted 42 times against Manchu rule with the purpose of regaining their independence. The Manchu were finally expelled in 1864 and Uyghurs established Yetteshahar State. However, the independence was short-lived, Manchus invaded East Turkistan again in 1876. After eight years of bloody war, the Manchu Empire formally annexed East Turkistan into its territories and renamed it “Xinjiang” (meaning “New Territory”) on November 18, 1884 (Millward 2007).

Under the Republic of China

After the Chinese Nationalist Government (Guomindang, hereafter GMD) overthrew the Manchu Empire in 1911, East Turkistan fell under the rule of warlords of Chinese ethnicity who came to dominate provincial administration in the later years of the Manchu Empire. The Chinese central government had little control over East Turkistan during this period. The Uyghurs, who wanted to free themselves from foreign domination, staged numerous uprisings against Chinese rule, and twice (in 1933 and in 1944) succeeded in setting up an independent East Turkistan Republic (ETR).

GMD reconquered the East Turkistan Republic in September 1944. GMD's integrationist strategies toward East Turkistan remained much the same as those of the late Qing empire, and it planned to further colonize East Turkistan by sending up to a million Han Chinese, to replace all Turkic leaders with Han Chinese officials, and to impose higher taxes; however, these colonial strategies were not fully achieved (ibid., 81-82).

With the aim of ensuring the legitimacy of its rule, GMD espoused the notion that the indigenous non-Han peoples of East Turkistan were originally racially Chinese, denying the existence of ethnicities such as Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz (ibid. 82). GMD administration through its conduct and interactions with the Second East Turkistan Republic (1944-1949) demonstrated that it essentially upheld the continuity of both objectives and integrationist strategies of the Qing and Republican periods, which were then effortlessly transferred to the People's Republic of China (PRC) and executed with vehemence (Clarke 2007, 277-78).

Colonial Tactics of Communist China (1949 - 2000)

The founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 ushered in a new era of oppression to East Turkistan, as well as Tibet and to the rest of China for that matter. The Chinese communist reign in East Turkistan can be considered the darkest chapter in the history of the Uyghurs and East Turkistan. Under the current conditions, the very existence of the Uyghur nation is under threat. The Chinese communist government has been carrying out a vicious campaign against Uyghurs and other indigenous people of East Turkistan in order to permanently annex the lands of East Turkistan.

After having established its power in East Turkistan, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) executed a large scale Han resettlement program in East Turkistan, which had resulted in a rapid demographic change with respect to non-Han and Han populations. In 1949 the total population of East Turkistan was roughly 4.2 million, but by late 1979 the Han Chinese people accounted

for roughly half of the total population of 11 million (McMillen 1981, 66). In another statistical perspective, between 1940 and 1982, ... the Han's percentage of [East Turkistan's] population [increased] by a massive 2,500 percent. ... while the Uyghur population followed a more natural biological growth rate of 1.7 percent” (Gladney 2004, 112- 113).

The consolidation of CCP power in East Turkistan culminated in the formal establishment of the Production and Construction Corps (PCC, 兵团, bingtuan) in 1954, which consisted largely of demobilized People's Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers. East Turkistan Republic troops consisting predominantly of Uyghurs and Kazakhs, also known as Ili National Army, were incorporated into the PLA, and many of whom were demobilized and redeployed to settle on a network of paramilitary farms (the predecessor of the PCC), over whom the CCP had total control (McMillen 1981, 68). According to Cliff (2020, 3), the PCC was established as “a military-agricultural colony”, and it was the main propelling force behind the Han migration and in transforming the cultural landscape in East Turkistan. The PCC has continued to recruit up to the present more Han people from the interior of China to East Turkistan and lure them with social benefits that are largely not enjoyed by the Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples.⁴

In the 21st century the PCC has become a corporation, enabling the CCP to achieve an increasingly direct control over East Turkistan (Cliff 2009, 102). Furthermore, today's PCC “retains only the slightest connection to the [People's Liberation Army]” (ibid., 101). The PCC in its core continues to perpetuate the occupying and colonizing function in its nature (Cliff 2009).

Yi (2019, 54) argues that the root cause of the ongoing persecution of millions of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in East Turkistan can be attributed to “Chinese settler colonialism”, which is unfolded through the Production and Construction Corps (PCC) and ethnic Han migration to the region.

The central government in Beijing gave the “autonomy” status to East Turkistan in 1955, which is reflected in its official Chinese name: 新疆维吾尔自治区(Xinjiang Uyghur

Autonomous Region). However, the agency for independent actions regarding internal matters within East Turkistan was dead on arrival, for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) never intended to give the true autonomy to East Turkistan (Xinjiang). The Communist Party leaders considered Uyghurs as “politically untrustworthy”, thereby allocating minimum power to them (Bovingdon 2010, 47).

⁴ A typical PCC recruitment advertisement in Chinese published in Feb 2020: <https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/PaBVRHjiMUtev7OzSh7O3Q> if deleted please see <https://web.archive.org/web/20200426130614/https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/PaBVRHjiMUtev7OzSh7O3Q>

As a matter of fact, smaller regional subautonomous districts and counties were already being established in the spring of 1953. “The division of [East Turkistan] into a number of smaller autonomies was a stroke of administrative genius” (ibid., 44). This integrationist policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) promoted and placed the idea that East Turkistan was home to thirteen ethnic groups to the foreground, “...counterbalancing the Uyghurs’ overwhelming political and demographic weight” (ibid., 45). Moreover, the party wanted to distance itself from the assimilationist policy of the Chinese Nationalist Party (GMD) and to counteract the separatism sentiments in some key frontier regions (Millward 2007, 243).

What was striking about this policy was the imbalance of power distribution, disproportionately allocated to the titular ethnic group in the sub-autonomous regions/districts. In fifteen out of twenty-seven sub-autonomous districts, the titular ethnic group accounted for less than half the population (Bovingdon 2010, 46), creating this imbalanced representation of power between Uyghurs and other ethnic groups⁵. For instance, “in 2004 some 48,000 Mongols nominally exercised autonomy in a region with more than 370,000 Uyghurs (and, due to steady immigration, more than 660,000 Hans)” (ibid.).

With respect to the Uyghur language, it was the communist regime who solely dictated the script variety of the Uyghur language. In 1956 the Chinese communist regime, following the footsteps of the Soviet, introduced a Cyrillic-based script for the Uyghur language when Uyghurs already had Arabic-based scripts, the aim of which to a large extent was to weaken Uyghurs’ Islamic connections. Then in 1960 following a dent in the ‘Sino-Soviet’ relations the Cyrillic-based script was superseded with the roman alphabet (with a few special letters), which would essentially be regarded as a ‘Pinyin-isation’ not a romanization of the Uyghur language (Millward 2007, 236). “Besides cutting off contact with Soviet Turkic peoples, one goal of this reform was to promote ‘fusion and assimilation’ of minorities by easing the introduction of Chinese vocabulary into Turkic languages” (ibid.). It is paramount to note that minority languages had not been taught for over a decade during the Cultural Revolution (Dwyer 2005, 366), e.g. the Uyghur language was not taught in Kashgar (Jarring 1986, 157).

In 1984, during a period of relatively relaxed minority policies, Chinese authority reinstated the slightly modified Arabic-based script for the Uyghur language. These script reforms under the PRC can be regarded as indicators of the general situation in East Turkistan, where each change in the writing

⁵ The 13 officially recognized ethnic groups in East Turkestan are: Han, Uyghur, Hui, Kazakh, Uzbek, Tajik, Kirghiz, Mongol, Tatar, Russian, Solon, Xibo and Manchu.

⁶ Not in accordance with the international standards for romanizing Turkic languages; e.g. The letter x is supposed to represent the uvular fricative ‘kh’ sound, but it was pinyinized to stand for ‘sh’ sound.

system reflects the vicissitudes of PRC minority policy toward Turkic peoples in East Turkistan (Millward 2007, 237).

The Cultural Revolution (1957-1978) marked drastic shifts in politics in China as well as in East Turkistan, which stirred chaos in the social and cultural spheres. In East Turkistan there was an upsurge in cultural intolerance from within the Chinese Communist Party, radiating outward towards various ethnically Turkic groups, where differences between Turkic peoples and the majority Han Chinese were deemed deviant, so the project of cultural homogenization gained extra momentum with the aim of achieving assimilation. It is worth mentioning that East Turkistan suffered more damage in its economy than other parts of China did during the Cultural Revolution (Millward & Tursun 2004, 96).

Following the rift in Sino-Soviet relations in the late 1950s, the CCP purged many non-Han political elites in East Turkistan, most of whom ended up in thought-reform labor camps (Millward & Tursun 2004, 93). We can draw parallels between the thought-reform labor camps and today's internment camps in East Turkistan, where the official motto of the latter resonates with that of the former: "transformation through education" (教育转化). The representation rate of Uyghurs in the government fell drastically by around 25% in the decade following 1965, and the representation was absent in the regional government in 1969 (ibid., 97).

The 1980s were by no means a peaceful period in East Turkistan. There were signs of social unrest, fraught with ethnic/interethnic conflicts. There were student demonstrations that demanded 'freedom', 'democracy' and 'equality between the nationalities'⁷. Their slogans also confronted the issues of nuclear testing in Lop Nor (health concerns regarding the local Turkic peoples), influx of Han people to East Turkistan, and the birth control (family planning/birth restrictions) policy that targeted minorities. Alexis-Martin (2019, 152-53) argues in her paper that "the colonization of Uyghur lands and their use by the PRC for nuclear weapon testing are representative of a mode of nuclear imperialism that treated Uyghur life as worthless". With respect to limiting the population growth, Uyghurs and other non-Han minorities had been exempted from the CCP's birth control policy that was rolled out in the early 1980s, but gradually it also applied to them, starting in 1987 with Uyghur party officials and later enforced to the whole minority populations within a few years' time (Bovingdon 2010, 58-59).

"These issues reflect not religious concerns per se, but rather concerns about the treatment and survival of Uyghurs as a nation" (Millward 2007, 282). Furthermore, Millward (ibid., 281) informs us that "movements for rights or

⁷ In the late 1980s there was also a wave of pro-democracy movement on campuses throughout China

independence in twentieth-century [East Turkistan] do not fit the commonly held notion of 'Islamic jihad'."

Religious activities were yet again restricted, heavily scrutinized, and in some cases banned by the Chinese regime. Imams had to get state approval, only those who were deemed patriotic and politically aligned with the Communist Party could retain their positions, a practice that has continued up to the present day in East Turkistan. Qur'an schools were closed down and all private scriptural study sessions were prohibited and stamped as illegal religious activities (Bovingdon 2010, 67). In 1991, 10 percent of circa 25000 Islamic clerics failed to retain their positions after a scrutiny conducted by communist officials (Harris 1993:120–21, cited in Bovingdon 2010, 66). The construction of many mosques were halted and many existing mosques at the time were closed down as the crackdown on Islam continued. Despite the fact that the freedom to believe and not to believe is constitutionally anchored, party cadres and students continue to involuntarily abnegate their right to believe.

Post 9/11 repression of the Uyghurs: “war on terror” erodes away Uyghur identity

On September 11, 2001 the world witnessed America’s worst terrorist attacks, and many years have passed, while its repercussions are still keenly felt by many around the world. It was also a turning point that has continued to affect both domestic and international policies across many regions of the world. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the United States, China officially issues its own “war on terror” document entitled Terrorist Activities Perpetrated by ‘East Turkistan’ Organizations and their Ties with Osama bin Laden and the Taliban”, which claimed that there was an extensive network of Uyghur terrorists posed serious security threats to China and the world. Beijing has labeled those who are fighting for independence of East Turkestan as “terrorists”. Beijing has considered Uyghur activists as a part of the network of international Islamic terror, with fundings from the Middle East, Pakistan, Chechnya and Afghanistan (Chung, 2002).

This shift in official discourse blurred the line between dissent and Islam. For example, the Baren Uprising in 1990, the 1995 protest in Khotan, and the Ghulja demonstration in 1997, all of which previously attributed to ‘splittists’, who were then relabeled as ‘terrorists’ in a 2004 article (Zhu Jun 2004, cited in Bovingdon 2010, 120).

The marginalization of the Uyghur language

Following years of gradual effort made by the Chinese regime to marginalize the Uyghur language as the medium of instruction in school and universities, it was decreed in May of 2002 that “Xinjiang University would no longer offer courses in the Uyghur language, at least in the first two years of coursework”, which was then implemented in September the same year (Dwyer 2005, 39-40; Wingfield-Hayes 2002). The Uyghur language as the medium of instruction has been reduced at all levels since 1984, while Mandarin was only taught in minority-schools as a second language until the mid-1990s, it became the medium of instruction from third grade after the mid-90s (Dwyer 2005, 36; 38-39).

Based on a number of interviews conducted with Uyghur teachers by Radio Free Asia (RFA 2011, also see RFA 2010), by 2011 there had been at least 1000 Uyghur teachers who underwent unfair dismissal due to low proficiency in Mandarin in elementary schools across East Turkistan. A decade after the language policy that was first initiated in 2001, schools across East Turkistan regularly stopped offering Uyghur language education. The so-called “bilingual” education really is a euphemism for mandatory Chinese education. Even Uyghur children in kindergartens could not escape the regime’s “bilingual” education campaign, an effort to effectively assimilate a whole Uyghur population. The same Mandarin-language-only curricula also apply to other ethnic groups, such as Tibetans in western Qinghai province. In late June of 2017, all use of the Uyghur language was prohibited across all levels of schooling including the preschool level in the prefecture of Khotan (*Hétían* 和田 in Chinese), and the ban also applies to all collective/communal activities and administration work within the education system; those who violate this order would face ‘severe punishment’ (RFA 2017; also see RFA 2020b).

From September 1, 2017, following a region-wide directive entitled “The Standard Plan for Bilingual Education Curriculum in the Compulsory Education Phase of the Autonomous Region” (自治区义务教育阶段双语教育课程实施方案 *zìzhìqū yìwù jiàoyù jiēduàn shuāngyǔ jiàoyù kèchéng shèzhì fāng'àn*) the so-called “bilingual” education across all elementary and junior high schools in East Turkistan started shifting to Mandarin-only education, i.e. the end goal would be that all teaching materials and the medium of instruction would be only in Mandarin Chinese (Byler 2019a). There has been an effective way of accelerating the assimilation process of the younger Uyghur generation, namely putting them in boarding schools, also known as residential schools, removing them from their familiar home communities.

Scholars have consistently demonstrated that the Uyghur language is paramount to the Uyghur identity. In recent years, the Chinese state has arrested more than a hundred Uyghur intellectuals who have successfully navigated the worlds of academia, art and journalism (Ramzy 2019). Uyghur linguists have become the latest target of the sweeping crackdown in East Turkistan. According to the UTJD database, 365 intellectuals have been registered missing / detained / sentenced since 2016.

Table 1 below gives information about missing or detained intellectuals divided into gender. Summarise the information by selecting and reporting the main features, and make comparisons where relevant.

Category	Male	Female	Total Number
Actor / Actress	12	6	18
Writer	12	3	15
Journalist	6	2	8
Lecturer	4	3	7
Librarian	0	2	2
Teacher	76	20	96
Editor	39	6	45
Linguist	4	0	4
Poet	12	2	14
Professor	16	3	19
Researcher	11	1	12
Student (over 18)	100	14	114
Total	292	62	354

Table 1: The gender distribution by linguistic featured professions.

The table illustrates some important facts about the professional background of the missing/detained individuals. It allows comparison between the number of detainees who have knowledge in different fields which relates to Uyghur language and culture.

The prominence of teachers and academicians is relatively higher, 96 teachers have been missing/detained among the 354 intellectuals in total. In terms of academics, 19 professors, 12 researchers and 7 lecturers have been registered detained, several of them have received prison sentence for committing “separatist activities”, others are alleged for having “two-faced tendencies”.

According to Radio Free Asia, it is identified 5 Uyghur professors from Xinjiang University held in “political re-education camps” (RFA, 2018).

Prof. Azat Sultan, former vice president of Xinjiang University was arrested for "two-faced tendencies." A staffer for the university's political department was told "[Prof. Sultan's] approach was against our party - his thoughts showed a separatist tendency. He took advantage of his lecturing position in an uncontaminated place like the university to preach his separatist ideas." (RFA 2018).

Witness statement of Abdurahman Imam Hamdullah

Abdurahman Imam Hamdullah is a Uyghur linguist and researcher who previously worked at Xinjiang Ethnic Language Work Committee. Hamdullah was arrested in early 2019, according to his son Yashar Hamdullah currently living in exile in Norway. Below is Yashar Hemdullah’s witness statement where he testifies for his arbitrarily detained father Abdurahman Hamdullah.

“My name is Yashar Hemdullah. I have been living in Norway for 10 years. I work at a private company. In order to preserve Uyghur culture overseas, I have been taking musical classes from local artists here and I’ve been preparing to achieve my long-term plan to study music (at a university).

Today, I am testifying for my father Hemdullah Abdurahman who was born in 1957 in the Yeghiyar Village of Pichan County (of East Turkistan). He studied Turkology at Beijing (Peking) Minzu(Nationalities) University. After graduation, he had been working in the Dictionary Division at the Regional Committee on Ethnic Language and Writing of the Uyghur Autonomous Region (aka Xinjiang or East Turkestan). During his tenure at this position, he had participated in numerous projects on compiling Uyghur dictionaries such as the Annotated Dictionary of Uyghur Language (total 7 volumes/books), the Dictionary of Uyghur Handicrafts, and he had published many academic papers. My dad is fluent in many languages such as Japanese, Arabic, Turkish, etc., and he has mentored students in those languages. In addition, my dad had published many academic papers on various topics such as Uyghurs names and Chinese borrowed/loan words in the Uyghur language. My dad was a person who loved (proud of) his mother language (i.e. Uyghur), Uyghur culture and art. Unfortunately, my dad was taken/arrested by the Chinese regime in January of 2019. Ever since we have not been able to learn his whereabouts despite numerous efforts and attempts by us. According to some reliable sources in the Uyghur diaspora, my dad was arrested on an alleged “crime” of working on Uyghurification of place names (in the Uyghur region).

I hope that the Chinese government immediately releases my father and other innocent Uyghurs who have been arrested/interned. I also demand that the Chinese government face/answer the international community for their action.”

Witness statement of Abduweli Ayup

Abduweli Ayup is a western educated linguist and poet who operated Uyghur Language School in Kashgar. He is a strong proponent of linguistic human rights, specifically, the right for the intergenerational transmission of language and culture. Ayup was arrested on 19th of August, 2013 by the Chinese State Security Police, for promoting linguist rights of Uyghur people through his online writings and opening a mother language kindergarten in Kashgar.

“When I was arrested, my arms were twisted behind my back and I was handcuffed, at the same time a hood placed over my head before I was thrown into a police van. First, I was taken to a police station where I was forced to sit on what was called ‘a Tiger Chair’.

My ankles, wrists and my neck were secured to the chair by chains before my interrogation commenced. During the questioning they hit the palms of my hands while threatening me to admit that I have committed the crimes that they accused me of. Regardless of the beatings and threats I refused to admit anything. I was then taken to a detention centre at around 9:00 pm by three of the men who arrested me. First, I was taken to a hall, where they stripped me naked, there were approximately 20 convicted criminals working there whose crimes were murder, serious robbery, etc. Once I had been stripped naked, they encircled me and attacked me. Then I was thrown into a cubical type cell in which you could not stand up but only move in crouch position. There was an open toilet which gave off a putrid smell that was unbearable.

The next day I was transported to Urumqi, arriving at around 9:00 pm, the same procedure of interrogation took place, secured to a tiger chair, beatings of the hands and shoulders and threatening verbal interrogation. After this ordeal, I was taken to a hospital. As I had a hood placed over my head, I don't know which hospital it was. I know they carried out a full body check, X-ray, taking saliva, urine, and blood samples, applying a cold gel before examining different body organs. After which I was then taken to Tengritagh detention centre, I was beaten up on arrival before being placed in a cell. The cell was small and constructed of glass, the detention term for this was called 3D watch, where I was beaten once more.” (China Tribunal, n.d.)

Witness statement of Yalqun Rozi

A public figure, journalist, writer and literary critic, born in Atush in 1966, and graduated from Xinjiang University in 1987. He worked as a journalist for Urumchi People's Radio Broadcasting. From 1991, he worked as an editor for

“Xinjiang Education” newspaper, and from 2005, he worked as an editor for Xinjiang Education Publishing. He is the author of many books and articles about Uyghur education, literary criticism, modern history and various Uyghur historical and social issues. He was detained in October 2017 soon after he returned from a trip abroad. Yalkun Rozi is sentenced to 15 years in prison (Uyghur Pen 2020). Below is Kamaltürk Yalkun’s statement where he testifies for his father Yalkun Rozi.

“China's overseas propaganda network, CGTN, has just released a new propaganda film about Uyghurs. In it's new film called “Challenges of fighting terrorism in Xinjiang: The textbooks”, my father, along with several of his colleagues are portrayed as political prisoners. To give you some background information, my father Yalkun Rozi was appointed by the Xinjiang education department as the Chief Editor of the Uyghur language literature textbooks for primary and middle school education. He and his colleagues were arrested in 2016 and interrogated for more than a year at an undisclosed location by Chinese authorities. In 2018, we heard my father was held in a shame trial and was sentenced to 15 years in prison.

Until this day, we didn't have a chance to talk to my father, we didn't have a chance to see my father, not even in pictures. we didn't have a chance to learn his health condition, and we didn't learn his location of exact imprisonment. This is my first time seeing my father in 5 years (on CGTN documentary), and I almost could not recognise him if his name was not written in the film. From the pictures, everyone can clearly see the marks of torture and undernourishment they have experienced in Chinese prisons. This propaganda film is nothing but forced confessions of those prisoners.

What kind of horrible crimes did my father and his colleagues commit to be treated in such an inhuman and unlawful manner by China? Why has China decided to release a political propaganda film about them? First of all, the textbook was claimed for having fabricated and illegal content about East Turkestan. To support this claim, the CGTN has shown a historic picture and a famous Uyghur folklore story. The person in the picture is Ahmetjan Qasim, a famous Uyghur leader in 1940s, who was at a head of a revolution in East Turkestan, even Mao, the legendary chairman of the CCP, has chaired the revolution as “A part of the democratic revolution of the Chinese people”. However, in 2021, this historic Uyghur figure that was previously widely acknowledged by Chinese authorities themselves, suddenly filled into the category of people that represents radical terrorist ideology in China.

China hated these textbooks soo much that they banned these textbooks and imprisoned many people including my father with made up crime. However, in their own propaganda film, China is clearly admitting that the problems in these textbooks are that they don't have political contents, but only contents about

Uyghur history, literature and culture. However, those are literature textbooks, the function of these books were to purely teach Uyghur kids about their literature, language, grammar and cultural heritage, without inundating them with any type of political ideology. China is banning these Uyghur textbooks simply because they are written in Uyghur, and China wants to eradicate the Uyghur language and culture.

This film shows an interview of a former deputy chief of Urumqi Public Security Bureau. We had learned that the person Kadir Memet, is one of the key persons who interrogated my father and his colleagues, and built up a case of textbooks. In the film, he talks about how harmful and dangerous these textbooks are, and how important it is to safeguard the communist ideology sectors in schools. Clearly, this propaganda film was not made recently, it was filmed at least 2 - 3 years ago. In an ironic term of events, this deputy chief, Kadir Memet, was also arrested 2 years ago by Chinese authorities, according to the reports from Radio Free Asia.”

July 5th uprising and its implications

On July 5, 2009 Uyghurs defiantly, yet peacefully took to the streets in the city of Ürümchi, the administrative capital of East Turkistan, to protest against the Chinese government's handling of the recent deaths of and brutal attacks on Uyghurs working at the Xuri toy factory (旭日玩具厂 xùrì wánjùchǎng) in the city of Shaoguan in southern province of Guangdong. On the night of June 25, a Han mob (i.e. Han workers at Xuri toy factory) stormed the Uyghur dormitories armed with metal rods, clubs, and machetes and carried out a violent attack on the Uyghur workers, in response to what seemed to be the fallacious/rumorous accounts⁸ of sexual assaults on Han women. According to official numbers, two Uyghurs were killed, and 120 people were injured, most of whom were Uyghurs. There were videos posted online, probably taken by bystanders, showing hundreds of men carrying out one-sided savage assault on the Uyghurs. One eyewitness account reveals the brutality of the assaults that involved a thousand workers or so: "[p]eople were so vicious, they just kept beating the dead bodies" (Jacobs 2009). Hundreds of Han workers involved in the violence left the factory the following day to avoid arrest (Watts 2009).

According to another eyewitness account reported by The Guardian (ibid.), the real death toll was more than 30, as he himself helped to kill seven or eight Uyghurs. Security forces stepped in and prevented the press from conducting interviews with the Han workers who had been involved in the violence, accompanied by media censorship, which implied a cover-up, a concerted effort made by the Chinese government to conceal the real death toll (Smith Finley 2011, 74-5).

The news of this horrible inter-ethnic violence that transpired in Shaoguan hit the Uyghurs hardback in East Turkistan, and countless many witnessed and were enraged by the mercilessly savage attacks on their fellow Uyghurs through videos circulated online posted by bystanders on sohu.com, including an appalling sight of a Han Chinese dragging what appeared to be a dead Uyghur body by his hair. Within days of the Shaoguan fatal violence, Uyghurs in Ürümchi started organizing a protest, using various internet and other communication channels (Watts 2009). Many Uyghurs from other parts of East Turkistan, especially from the south, arrived in Ürümchi before the demonstration, according to Ürümchi Uyghur and official government sources (Millward 2009b, 351).

⁸ Local authorities found no evidence of any sexual assault committed by Uyghur workers, see RFA 2009a

On July 5, 2009 at around 5pm local time (7pm Beijing time) Uyghurs started to amass for the protest, marching towards the People's Square in Ürümqi. One protest organizer emphasized in an interview to Radio Free Asia (RFA 2009b) that the protest should not be violent. The collective demand was simple: investigate the Shaoguan killings and restore justice. Some protesters even had PRC flags and waved them as they marched on (Millward 2009b, 351), used in a way to both show their loyalty to the Chinese state and as a "protective shield", as protest of any sort could land you behind bars in East Turkistan. They also shouted slogans in both Uyghur and Mandarin, strongly condemning ethnic discrimination (Ramzy 2009).

What started out as a peaceful demonstration only turned violent after police intervention. As protesters were approaching the People's Square in Ürümqi, the armed police were already in position and intercepted protesters' further advance. The armed police started beating, detaining, and chasing after the protesters in a vicious manner, according to an eyewitness (RFA 2009b). Chinese official sources reported that 70 protesters were arrested right then and there (HRW 2009). There was no effort made on the part of the authorities in having a dialogue with the protesters about the Shaoguan killings. Instead the armed police detained the protest leaders, and thereafter the crowds acted aimlessly; if the government had taken the initiative to have a meaning dialogue with the protesters, the subsequent rioting could have been averted in Ürümqi, according to a businessman in an interview (RFA 2009b).

Chinese officials confirmed that the armed security forces used tear gas, stun grenades, and high pressure water guns to disperse the crowds, though some Uyghur activists accused them of opening fire on the protesters (Foster & Moore 2009a). As the protesters got agitated by the use of unnecessary force, they contacted their friends elsewhere in the city, informing them of the violent suppression of the protest, which, according to Millward (2009b, 352), triggered the subsequent rioting. International students who were in Ürümqi at the time confirmed hearing gun shots after dark on July 5 (Smith Finley 2011, 76). Media footage⁹ and Chinese official admissions¹⁰ also corroborated many eyewitnesses' as well as Uyghur activists' accusations of the use of gunfire made against the security forces.

The Chinese regime quickly accused "outside forces" such as Rebiya Kadeer and the World Uyghur Congress of instigating the rioting, while Kadeer (2009) rebutted the allegation by stating that "[r]eal peace cannot be achieved through a complete lack of acknowledgment of ethnic discrimination and

⁹ Buckley (2009a) reports that "a spray of bullet holes could be seen on the glass front of a Bank of China office".

¹⁰ On July 7 seven Uyghur patients undergoing treatment at the People's Hospital had been shot (Foster & Moore 2009a). Nur Bekri, the chairman of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region at the same, stated that 12 Uyghurs were shot dead after ignoring warning shots (Duncan 2009).

ethnic disharmony in East Turkestan”. This quick move taken by the Chinese regime to put the blame on foreign Uyghur activists showed it failed miserably to acknowledge “a boiling over of existing tensions between Uyghurs and Han in the region [East Turkistan]” (Roberts 2018, 242).

From July 6, 2009 the international press was given limited access to the city of Ürümchi to cover the aftermath of the peaceful-demonstration-turned-violent incident. The following day the reporters were taken on an officially arranged tour to the Han areas impacted by the riots, where they ran into an emotional demonstration by Uyghur women, who appealed to foreign journalists, calling for the immediate release of their sons and husbands detained during and after the riots. By July 7, around 1434 suspects were arrested by the police (Foster & Moore, 2009a; Branigan 2009), most of whom being Uyghur if not all. As an authoritarian regime, China decided to cut off the internet access, international phone calls and text messaging after the Han Chinese mobilized their reprisal attacks on Uyghurs, while these services had not been restored until 10 months after (Huang & Wills 2010).

Chinese Communist Party does not tolerate dissent, and anyone who dares question its authority, legitimacy, course of action as well as the ones who offer constructive criticisms will be persecuted and prosecuted, in the case of the Uyghur economics professor Ilham Tohti at the Central University for Nationalities in Beijing, life in prison. He was detained for several weeks following the July 5 events for having documented cases of Uyghurs who had been arrested, killed, and disappeared and posted the information online (Amnesty International 2016). He had written critically about the Chinese regime’s minority policies toward Uyghurs, offering constructive criticisms with recommendations with regard to, among other things, the use of the Uyghur language, the practice of religion, discrimination on the job market for Uyghur applicants, and the state-sponsored Han migration into East Turkistan. In the subsequent years, he had been under house arrests multiple times for varying periods. On September 23, 2014, after a closed two-day trial, he was found guilty of separatism and sentenced to life in prison (ibid.). “Tohti’s life sentence for alleged separatism, extreme even in the context of the PRC’s punishment of dissenting intellectuals, illustrates the lack of tolerance the state and the Chinese Communist Party now had for any substantive dialogue with Uyghur voices” (Roberts 2018, 245).

There had been indiscriminate arrests and enforced disappearances following the July 5 protest. Amnesty International (2010, 21) notes that people had been detained during the protests, and sweeping door-to-door searches were carried out on July 6 by the security forces, which resulted in a large number of arrests of alleged protest participants and those suspected of taking part in violence acts. However, the Chinese authorities did not make public the names and other information of the arrested. Moreover, Human Rights Watch (HRW

2009, 21- 22) notes that the sweeping raids brought about “a widespread campaign of unlawful arrests” in Uyghur districts of Ürümqi, which resulted in at least dozens of untraceable disappearances¹¹. There had also been targeted raids arresting an unknown number of people from their homes, work places, doctors’ offices, or from the streets (ibid., 23-24). While the real number of those arrested and imprisoned in connection with the riots remains unknown, a source briefed on security matters told Financial Times that more than 4000 Uyghurs had already been arrested within the first two weeks following the July 5 events (Hille 2009).

Witness statement of Adil Alim (Male, Uyghur)

“I am Adil Alim, I was born in Tianshan District, Urumqi City, on July 23rd 1985, I am currently living in the United States. I was arrested by Chinese police in 2009 when I planned and participated in a peaceful demonstration organized by student groups from the Xinjiang University. The background of the demonstration was due to the “Toy Factory Incident” which took place in ShaoGuang City, GuangDong province, where a group of Uyghur factory workers were killed by their Han colleagues. The aim of the demonstration was to demand the Chinese authorities to investigate the ShaoGuang incident and restore justice.

Prior to the 5th of July demonstration, from June 28th to July 3rd, our team tried several times to apply for Parade Permission from the local authorities in East Turkestan, we demanded the government to issue an open statement regarding the tragedy in ShaoGuang. Local and central governments were informed about the demonstration in advance. However, they never respond to our request.

I attended the Law School at Xinjiang University in 2009. In summer 2009, some videos of the ShaoGuang incident were shared on the internet. After watching several online videos of the mass-killings, students from our faculty reached out to other universities to co-host a peaceful demonstration, to express our dissatisfaction on Chinese government's inaction towards the crime in ShaoGuang.

The organizers of the demonstration were divided into several groups. Group A was responsible for contacting the Urumqi City Government to apply for a permission for peaceful demonstration. In response, students were ignored by the city administration and no permits were issued. Group B was responsible for contacting international media and look for journalists at Global

¹¹ Human Rights Watch (2009, 21) had documented at least 43 cases of enforced disappearances between July 6 and early August of 2009

International Hotel in Urumqi (环球国际大酒店). Nevertheless, the guards did not allow anyone to enter or leave the hotel. Therefore, we decided to promote the idea of the demonstration through social media and other channels, aiming to let the international society take notice of our action. On June 29th, a QQ group released some information about the July 5th demonstration on several major Uyghur websites. Group C were responsible for the logistics including purchase of promotional banners, they went to the Nanmen Underground Bazaar. Nevertheless, they could not purchase anything because the Urumqi Public Security Bureau has issued a document stating that “no shops are allowed to make banners for anyone that could be detrimental to the government”. Alternatively, we made the posters on our own. As the publicity of the demonstration outspread on the internet, many Uyghurs from other parts of East Turkistan came to Urumqi to join the demonstration.

The demonstration started on the 5th of July, about 4:30pm Urumqi time. The plan was to march towards People's Square in Urumqi from three different directions (Northern Road 北门, Yan-an Road 延安路, Southern Road 大西门). According to the plan, we should have met the other teams at People's Square. We have chosen People's Square because the head office of the Uyghur Autonomous Region Government was located there.

I was walking together with the Yan-an Road group. When we reached Nanmen Square at around 5pm, we were stopped by a group of policemen, they lined up in 3 rows, the first and second rows had five cameras with them. We got stuck there and we could not move forward. We had some posters on our hands, along with the PRC flag to express that we are demonstrating peacefully and did not have any tendency of violence. We sat quietly on the street. In the meanwhile, I took out my phone to contact the other demonstration groups to inform them about our situation. However, the signal was extremely unstable, I had to send the same message 10 times to get it delivered, and the call was reached after several times. At this moment, some black-dressed men and plainclothes policemen entered our group. At about 5:10, they took out their iron stick and started to beat people. They rushed purposefully towards students who were holding posters and taking pictures. I was not lucky enough to avoid their punches, I was beaten on my head from behind, my head bled immediately, the scenario was chaotic. Some students began to run to the roadside, people on the street witnessed the situation and this is how the demonstration turned violent.

My head was injured and continued bleeding. I tried to stop the escalation of the conflict, I ran into the crowd while holding my head with my hands. At this moment, I was called by a few policemen to get into a huge car marked as “police”. To be honest, I was naive at the time, I thought I was safe because I did not commit any crime. I studied law, I believed I could uphold justice by the

power of the constitution. I never expected that this minibus would take me to hell, it gave the most unforgettable and horrible memories in my life.

The bus was full of people, many people were in handcuffs, we were asked to hold our heads and sit down. We arrived at a special-police training base located next to a Muslim cemetery in Da-wan District. The policemen registered our names on the bus, they took our ID cards, belts, wallets, mobile phones, watches, shoes, and my glasses, as well as other items. Following that, they asked us to move to the sports field of the training base and lie down on the ground.

The daytime is quite long in Urumqi, I could not perceive the time because my watch was taken by a policeman. When it started to get dark, I heard an explosion, and then, I heard someone talking on an interphone and said, "from this moment on, they are all terrorists, just treat them like terrorists.", after that, I heard machine guns shooting from the interphone. We were still lying on the ground, after the order, the policemen began beating us with plastic sticks violently. After a while, we were taken to another bus, wearing black headgear on our head, and handcuffed in the bus. The policemen forced us to lower our heads to avoid being seen by the public on the streets, and those who looked up were beaten again.

We arrived at the Liu-dao-wan detention center. Upon our arrivals, I heard people screaming, crying, and shouting, it was scary. At this moment, I heard someone speaking on an interphone again, he said the Liu-dao-wan detention center is full and that we should be transferred to Tian-Shan district detention center.

We arrived at the Tian-Shan district detention center, they counted us one by one and took us inside. I saw 4 rows of armed police, they had spiked clubs on their hands. They took off our handcuffs and began beating us, the spiked clubs had a lot of thorns on it, when they beat me, the thorns pierced into my skin. There was a young child among us, his handcuffs got into his arm bone and could not be removed, his hands were bleeding. A prison-doctor came to check him and said that his hands must be sawed off in order to survive. Then, a prison guard came and sawed off the child's hand with a chainsaw, he was not given any clinical anesthesia.

The prison guards took us into a big hall and asked us to line up and get undressed. There were male and female in the crew, we were all naked. We were asked to stand there quietly, those who slightly moved were beaten into death. After a while. The prison guards separated male and female, they gave us some clothes to wear, and I got a pair of used stinky underwear. After that, they took me to another room. As soon as I entered the room, about 20 people began to beat me. At that time, my whole body was beaten and turned black, and I kept bleeding from my head, elbows, thighs and knees. After a while,

they flushed cold water on me to prevent visceral injuries. For several days, they sprinkled water on the cement floor and forced us to sit there with our hands wrapped around our heads. Once we put our hands down, a group of people came over to beat us. We were beaten every day when the news broadcasting program started, also before we went to sleep.

On the 15th day, I was transferred to Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps' detention centers. We were only given 1 meal a day, we had to sing the communist song before the meal, otherwise we wouldn't be given food. We had to memorize some slogans about Chinese ethnic policy, and a set of prison regulation rules. More importantly, we were harshly beaten by prison guards every morning and night.

I stayed at the Corps detention center for about a week, then I was transferred to Xi-shan re-education center. It was a basement and there was absolutely no sunlight. We were 20 people living in a small cell, we were given three different buckets each, one filled with water, and the other two were buckets for feces and urine. We were frequently tortured during the interrogations. In order to make us look like terrorists, we were not given any haircuts or showers for several months. For the first time in my life, I got louse on my body. The prison guards took picture of us, the pictures were later sent to the United Nations as evidence for Uyghur terrorism. We were only given steamed white bread with soup that tasted like hot water every day. I lost 20kg in weight when I was released.


Those are my experiences from 5th of July which I found extremely horrible to look at. On the 9th of September, I was acquitted with a verdict of "" not guilty". Since then, I have been repeatedly harassed by the community, sub-district offices, public security agencies and other related units. I had to report my whereabouts every week and submit a thought report on a monthly basis. I had to ask several different authority's permission for travels out of Urumqi City. Although I was released with a "not guilty" verdict, it was impossible for me to find a job in East Turkestan (XUAR). It was necessary to submit a proof of innocence and background check report for all employers, I was never able to get these documents, the officers usually responded to me with cold-eyes and dirty language. Those experiences brought an inestimable psychological shadow to my life.

After all, I decided to leave East Turkestan, I moved to Yiwu City, Zhejiang province and worked with international trade and finance. On January 19th 2013, I established the largest charity found in Urumqi, named "Learn love and be loved" 《懂爱爱心组织》. In February 2014, an earthquake dispeopled the Hoten City in southern East Turkestan. At that time, I carried out a donation representing my charity. Unfortunately, I was targeted by the local authorities again, I was taken to a detention center once a month, at Nr.6 National Security

Bureau in Urumqi, the officers rapidly asked questions about the source of charity funds, list of charity members, and my personal economy. Although our team has completed the necessary procedures and legal documents, the local authorities still tried to break up our organization, because they did not like Uyghurs to unite and engage in various social activities.

Until July 2014, the “Learn love and be loved” charity gathered more than 2.4 million members, about 87% of the members were Uyghurs, the rest included other ethnic groups like Han, Kazakh, Hui, Kirgiz, etc. On 31st of October 2014, I left China to Los Angeles, the United States.

Supplement Documents



Picture 1: verdict of “No Guilty”.



Picture 2: Proof of charity fund

The camp system: a mean of inflicting state terror

What has been transpiring in East Turkistan in the last few years, already engendered copious international opprobrium, can be described as “a composite version of twentieth century authoritarian fantasies and popular dystopias that is made possible by twenty-first century technology” (Clarke 2018; Vanderklippe 2017; cited in Cliff 2019, 181), accompanied by the Chinese regime’s intensified efforts to coercively indoctrinate Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples in a massive network of internment camps, subject Uyghurs to forced labor, indoctrinate Uyghur children (i.e. The Stolen Generation), control Uyghur birth rates (i.e. genocide in accordance to the UN Genocide Convention), for which the endgame is to eradicate the Uyghur identity and thereby accomplishing a successful assimilation, effectively constituting an ethnocide.

Since 2017 news outlets in the West have been covering China’s unprecedented social reengineering project that is the mass indoctrination camps. The Chinese regime intensified its efforts to persecute the Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims by rounding them up in their estimated millions and effectively extrajudicially/extralegally interned them in many of its so-called “re-education” camps, prison-like fortified internment facilities, across East Turkistan (aka. Xinjiang). In the summer of 2017, Uyghurs in East Turkistan began deleting their contacts (i.e. friends and family members) abroad on the Chinese social messaging app Wechat. They also made clear to their contacts abroad that they should stop the communication by phone calls, or else troubles would ensue.

As the situation was getting tense in the region, satellite imagery showed a wave of building complexes/projects installed with double fences and guard towers across the region. Many existing facilities were likely converted to prison-like compounds, based on many procurement bids advertised to construction companies that required installations of prison-style features (Denyer 2018). These internment camps are equipped with barbed wire, security fences, surveillance devices, surveillance rooms, guard railings, and guard netting (Introvigne 2018). As of October 2018, the Agence France-Presse (AFP 2018), based on its collected data, estimated that there were at least 181 internment facilities. In an interview conducted by Radio Free Asia on November 8, 2019, Adrian Zenz, a senior fellow in China Studies at the Washington-based Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, estimated, based on the Communist Party’s primary source documents as well as other sources of information, that the number of the internment camps in East

Turkistan had likely surpassed 1000, a speculative number that he was cautiously confident about (RFA 2019).

The conditions in the internment camps have been pestilential, according to the former camp teacher Qelbinur Sedik (Ingram 2020). The internees were crammed into small spaces, allowed to go to the toilet only three times a day at fixed times, and allocated 15 minutes for the shower that happened only once a month. At a women's internment camp in Ürümchi, each prison cell stank of urine, the source of which was from a toilet bucket that was placed in each cell and emptied once a day. The internees only had 1 minute for the face wash in the morning and were allowed to take a 15-minute long shower once a month. Consequently, many became sick given the highly unhygienic conditions.

Furthermore, there have been many reported cases of torture, which included for example “four kinds of electric shock: the chair, the glove, the helmet, and anal rape with a stick” (ibid.). Former internees told the Human Rights Watch that they had been subjected to physical abuse and torture: shackled, deprived of sleep, and beaten and hung from ceilings/walls (HRW 2018a, 33–36). Another former internee was tortured for not making his bed, forced to wear an outfit of iron claws and rods that had locked him in a star position for 12 hours; those like him, refused to comply, would also be fitted with handcuffs and ankle cuffs for up to 12 hours (Kuo 2018). If the noncompliance continued, they could be punished with waterboarding or strapped to a metal ‘tiger chair’ for 24 hours (Denyer 2018; Shih 2018). One Uyghur man, also a former internee, testified that he was subjected to gang rape by more than 20 camp guards (Chao 2019). A policewoman at a women's internment camp told a former camp teacher that each day several Uyghur girls would be gang raped by the Han Chinese executives in the camp, “sometimes with electric batons inserted into the vagina and anus” (Ingram 2020).

With respect to the number of people affected by one of up to 8 forms of extrajudicial/extralegal mass internment, estimates have ranged between 1 million to 3 million people: more than 1 million according to UN human rights panel (ABC 2018a); up to 1.5 million (Zenz 2019b); 2 to 3 million (Chinese Human Rights Defenders 2020); likely closer to 3 million, according to Randall G. Schriver, the US Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo- Pacific Security Affairs (Buckley & Wong 2019). The impact of this mass internment is felt nearly by every Uyghur family in East Turkistan in that at least one in each family and in countless other cases several individuals in a family are extrajudicially interned (Zenz 2019b). In the south of the region, up to 80% of adults in the cities are interned/detained at some point in 2018, according to the remaining locals; “empty streets in [Ürümchi] and Kashgar are an eerie testament to how the security campaign is fraying Xinjiang's economic and social fabric” (Feng 2018a).

In August 2016 Chen Quanguo (陈全国), the former Communist Party chief in Tibet, was transferred to East Turkistan to be the new party chief, which can be interpreted as “a vote of confidence” for his conflict management in Tibet, where he had developed and enforced “a new model of intensive policing and ‘grid surveillance’ 网格化管理 involving ‘convenience police stations’ 便民警务站”¹², accompanied by the ‘double-linked household management system’, i.e. “groups of ten families are required to spy on one another to check on security threats and risks of poverty” (Dillon 2019, 188), constituting a part of a more expansive social control: Three-Dimensional Public Security Preventative Control System (立体化社会治安防控体系) (Groot 2019, 102; also see Zenz & Leibold 2017a, 17). Based on the analysis of the ‘Qaraqash (Karakax) list’, a leaked Chinese government document, Zenz (2020b) notes that the primary role of Chen was to “adjust, optimize and especially upscale existing frameworks and mechanisms” linked to the mass internment efforts. Zenz also argues that prior to Chen’s transfer to East Turkistan, the “reeducation” framework was already developed and well under way.

The Grid-style surveillance management is made possible by utilizing CCTV cameras, mobile network technologies, and big data processing power, surveilling the public within a distinctly allocated geometric zone (Zenz & Leibold 2017b, 24), which turned East Turkistan to “a security state within a state”, “virtually quarantined from the rest of the PRC” (Roberts 2018, 246). This surveillance system primarily targets the general Uyghur population, making them “feel increasingly under siege in their own homeland” and thereby putting a strain on the long-term social stability in the region (ibid., 26). After being appointed as the party chief in East Turkistan, applying the same securitization tactics he had developed in Tibet, Chen within a year’s time had accomplished what took him five years in Tibet (Zenz & Leibold 2017a, 16)¹³.

Uyghurs across East Turkistan were commanded/forced to return to their hometowns, typically with fewer employment opportunities, to obtain a new checkpoint pass; visiting a relative in a neighboring town now requires a written permit; this measure restricts the mobility of the majority of the Uyghur population as they couldn’t procure such pass (Zenz & Leibold 2017a, 22; Byler 2020). The Uyghur mobility restrictions also include, among other things, the confiscation of passports (Wong 2016), the ordering (also repatriations) of

¹² Although these convenience police stations are designed to make intrusive securitization less intimidating, their primary objective is surveillance (Zenz & Leibold 2017b, 25). As of March 2017, there had been built or renovated 7300 such stations in East Turkistan, functioning as operational connecting points for each grid (Leibold 2020, 50).

¹³ Between August 2016 and July 2017, there had been advertised 90866 security-related positions, almost 12 times the number following the Ürümchi uprising in 2009, around 95% of which were assistant police positions that were linked to what were then circa. 7500 convenience police stations across East Turkistan (Zenz & Leibold 2017a, 18).

Uyghur students studying abroad to return home (Feng 2017)¹⁴, and enclosures of neighborhoods with fences accompanied by security checks (RFA 2016); the limitation of Uyghur movements also occurs between cities in addition to mobility restrictions within individual urban area.

The National People's Congress of the PRC, directly controlled by the Communist Party, officially approved the counter-terrorism law on December 27, 2015 that came into effect at the turn of the year, criminalizing almost all Uyghur dissenting voices, traditions, and Islamic belief and practices as indications of terrorism and extremism; moreover, this law was complemented by the “de-extremification regulations” that further encroaches upon Uyghur's public expressions of their religiosity, allowing to legally persecute “Uyghurs' thoughts, appearance, and behavior” (Roberts 2018, 246), though some local officials in East Turkistan had already been enforcing many of the regulations' restrictions for years, according to James Leibold (Gan 2017). As discussed earlier, neither the counter-terrorism law nor the de- extremification regulations allow for prolonged detention, i.e. the massive network of internment camps, with indefinite detention, are illegal.

At the end of 2014 the Communist regime put out a booklet entitled *The Basics to Identifying Religious Extremist Activities – 75 different signs of religious extremism* (识别宗教极端活动 (75 种具体表现)基础知识)¹⁵, consisting of three parts, viz., the advocacy of religious extremism ideology, abnormal religious extremist activities and their initial signs, and suspicion of engaging in illegal religious extremist activities. The public was encouraged to report to the police whenever there was an encounter with any of the 75 signs of religious extremism. Many signs on this list constitute grounds for internment (see Greer 2018).

According to the former detainees and their relatives interviewed by Byler (2020), they were interned because of the digital texts, audio clips, and videos that they shared on their mobile devices, and in many other cases the acts of registering several SIM cards by using single ID card, installing unsanctioned foreign apps such as Facebook and WhatsApp on their cell phones, or using VPNs (Virtual Private Networks) to bypass China's “great firewall” in order to access blocked websites, applications, or to simply anonymize their online activities by encrypting their web traffic. Constituting no real crime by any legal standard, “the digital footprint of unauthorized Islamic practice” or even one's association to someone who transgresses one of these violations, is reason enough to be taken away to one of the detention centers, and thereafter most Uyghurs would either receive lengthy prison sentences or be sent to one of the internment camps (Byler 2019b).

¹⁴ Many were untraceably disappeared upon arrival (Shih 2017).

¹⁵ <http://archive.fo/TIazC> (in Mandarin)

UTJD Research Findings

The UTJD is aimed to study China's systematic crackdown policy in East Turkistan, the team is conducting comprehensive research on each individual detention facility compiled with detailed information, preparing a fundamental data set to study China's camp system.

The primary objectives of the UTJDs present study are: i) To present a multi-temporal map of each detention facility with attribute table of additional information, matching various pieces of documentary evidence with satellite imagery; ii) To build a database with comprehensive information; iii) Provide a quantitative analysis of the detention facility and an assessment on the spatiotemporal changes of the different type of detention facility.

Over the past three years, our researchers have identified and mapped more than 530 suspected detention facilities, including 232 suspected "Re-education Camps" (集中营/再教育培训中心) construction sites, 257 Prisons (including detention centers) (监狱和看守所), and more than 152 Bingtuan Laogai (劳改农场监狱) detention facilities (reform through labor camps) in East Turkistan. In recent months, we have been working hard to build a database of detention facilities. Statistics dated to 14.05.2021.




Figure 1: the distribution of different types of detention facilities in East Turkistan

Most recently, after carefully inspecting some detention facilities using the Google Earth platform, our research group obtained some valuable information with evidential characteristics, which can directly prove the existence of concentration camps, forced labor workshops inside the camp, and their tight connections. In three large “Re-education” Camps in the Aqsu and Korla city of East Turkistan, detainees were wearing orange color prisoner’s uniforms (or factory uniforms), being escorted from their detention rooms to the forced labor factory through a high-security checkroom.

1. “Re-education” Camp 01 (41°7'27.76"N, 80°10'20.42"E) in Aqsu (a.k.a. Aksu) city. This Camp is located 1,200 meters east of the Funeral parlor/crematorium, built by the roadside of Wushi Road (or State Road 219) in Aqsu city.



Fig.2 Location of the two Camps in Aqsu city. Oct.24, 2018, approximately 1200 detainees (Shown with red scope line), dressed in orange or red-colored work uniforms, were lined up in rows and escorted from the high-security gate to the forced labor factory.



Fig.3 Sep.1, 2018, approximately 198 detainees (Shown with red scope line) were lined up in rows and escorted from the high-security gate to the forced labor factory.

2. "Re-education" Camp 02 (41°6'59.02"N, 80° 9'35.39"E) in Aqsu city. This Camp located 1kilometers east of the Hangzhou Road in Aqsu city.

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Fig.4 Apr.8, 2019, approximately 270 detainees (Shown with red and yellow scope line), dressed in the same uniforms, were lined up in rows and escorted to the forced labor factory (a) and to the canteen (b).

3. “Re-education” Camp 03 (41°44'10.35"N, 86° 8'9.25"E), Korla city. This Camp was set up along the Jianguo South Road in Korla city.



Fig.5 Mar.21, 2018, approximately 180 detainees (Shown with red scope line), dressed in the same uniforms, were lined up in rows and escorted to the forced labor factory.

These findings were reported as news articles by Radio Free Asia on November 13, 2020 and on November 13, 2020 respectively (Radio Free Asia 2020)

The Pathologization of Uyghur Religiosity

It is evident in official documents, e.g. the abovementioned surveillance workers' guideline, that the regime's mass internment drive has pathologized Uyghur religiosity. According to one Chinese government document¹⁶, anyone infected with an ideological "virus" must be promptly admitted to transformation-through-education centers, i.e. ideological "hospital", before illness arises. If you so happen to worry about the cost of all this, the government has got you covered, for this is a gratuitous residential treatment offer. The official discourse is fraught with the language of pathology, which "taps into a long history of what anthropologist Stevan Harrell called China's 'civilizing project', treating people on China's geographic and cultural periphery as inferior and therefore deserving of the colonial predation visited upon them" (Grose 2019). In the surveillance workers' guideline, the regime's salvation discourse is blatantly present: "The Communist Party and the government took preventative measures to save him, his family, and his family members so that he wouldn't embark on a path of self- destruction, hurt his family, or harm society; what part of all this do the family members not understand? Should be grateful to the party, right?" (党和政府为了不使其走上毁灭的道路、避免伤害家庭、危害社会，挽救了他、挽救了他的家庭，家属还有什么想不通的呢？是不是应该感谢党？).

The Chinese regime has continuously repressed the Uyghur religious identity over decades. In recent years, the community's religious staff and religious scholars, including imams, have been most vulnerable for persecution. Until 2021, the Uyghur Transitional Justice Database has registered 549 individuals with detailed descriptions about their religious atmosphere. Detainees are categorized as 1) Not religious, 2) Not practising, 3) Practising, 4) Religious Scholar. The table below is based on data provided by the Uyghur Transitional Justice Database.

Religious Atmosphere	Number	Ratio
Not religious	62	11.3%
Not practising	33	6%
Practising	361	65.7%
Religious scholars	93	17%

¹⁶ Available at <https://archive.vn/jMKNKZ> (in Mandarin)

Total	549	100%
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Table 2: Distribution on detainees religious atmosphere

Our information sources state that some of the detainees are imams and religious scholars who were previously trained and employed by Beijing administration. Those detainees are now sentenced with long prison terms, a few of them have lost their lives in internment camps.

Muhammed Salih Hajim

Muhemmed Salih Hajim has been described as one of the most respected and influential Uyghur religious scholars. He is credited with being the first scholar to translate the Quran into Uyghur in 1986. Muhammed Salih Hajim graduated from Xinjiang Social Science Academy.

In December 2017, at the age of 82, Muhemmed Salih Hajim was detained along with his daughter and other relatives by Chinese authorities. Hajim died in Chinese police custody, approximately 40 days after his detention. Many in the Uyghur community suspect he was tortured, but the Chinese government refuses to release Muhemmed's body to his family on the grounds that it might spark unrest.

A former neighbor of Muhemmed's daughter has confirmed that Muhemmed's daughter, her husband, and their 19-year-old son were also arrested. It is believed that their three other younger children (Salih's grandchildren) are now in the custody of state-run orphanages intended for Uyghur youth whose guardians have been detained. Muhemmed's sister, his brother and his brother's wife are also detained, along with their son.

Abidin Ayup

Abidin Ayup is a respected religious leader, he was born on 1st of February 1928. Ayup worked as an Imam at Kayrak Mosque in Atush for 30 years, he was 89 year old when he was arrested. It is unclear when the exact detention took place, but the available evidence makes it reasonable to hypothesize that it was sometime between January and April 2017.

According to Ayup's niece Mariye Muhemmed, Abidin was detained and then hospitalized in Atush, judging by the court verdict. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that he was kept in the locality (and not transferred elsewhere). The court document refers to the victim as "an inheritor of religious extremist

thought" (宗教极端思想传承人) and "a key person for reform through education" (重点教育改造人员), suggesting that he was detained for his identity as a religious leader.

The court verdict indicates both that he was detained and that he's in poor health (as of May 2017). However, it is not clear what his current status is.

Coercive family separation

With 1 to 3 million people incarcerated in some form of mass internment, many Uyghur children have been deprived of one or both parents. Countless families have been coercively separated, in some cases there were relatives or extended families to take care of the children, but the regime forcibly sent thousands of children to de facto orphanages anyway; in many other cases, where given the regime's large-scale mass internment drive not only the parents but also the extended families have been sent away to the mass internment camps, as a result, the younger children would end up in "child welfare guidance centres", while older children may end up in state-run vocational schools, according to locals in Ürümchi and Kashgar (Feng 2018b). When Associated Press journalists visited one kindergarten with "a walled enclosure lined with barbed wire" in Khotan where one of their Uyghur informants' four children were believed to be kept, they were prevented from doing their job of investigating, and were ordered to delete any photos taken by armed police (Wang & Kang 2018).

The Kashgar local government states in an official document¹⁷ that children who attend the 4th grade and above with parent(s) taken to the internment camps must go to boarding schools at the first opportunity, including the scenario in which one parent is still at home. It also states that government officials must follow up on parent(s) or custodians and do the necessary persuasion work, and guide them so that they themselves take the initiative to send their children to boarding schools. The guideline also necessitates regular varied "educational" activities/instillation: in elementary schools, students must be instilled with e.g. core values in socialism, gratitude education (i.e. be grateful to your country), serve-your-country contents; in junior high, students must be instilled with for example 75 signs of religious extremism; in high schools, students must be instilled with for example legal education. One boarding school The Associated Press visited in 2018, the No. 4 High School in Peyziwat county (伽师县), was installed with barbed wire around its school complex and dormitory buildings (Wang & Kang 2018). "The educational goals are secondary to

¹⁷ "Notice on the Further Improvement of the Educational Administration of the Boarding School System for the Students in Tough Predicament" (关于进一步做好困境学生寄宿制教育管理工作的通知) available at <https://archive.vn/AMJxJ> (in Mandarin)

the political goals. They aim to dissolve loyalties to ethnic identity... toward a national identity” said professor Timothy Grose to The Associated Press (ibid.).

Drawing on a wide range of sources, from official documents and reports, Chinese state media articles, to government policy directives, Zenz (2019c) presents compelling evidence arguing for the existence of large-scale state-directed various types of “intergenerational separation” (i.e. family separation). Anticipating a large number of children would be left uncared for after interning their parents in its mass internment drive, the Chinese regime established a parallel massive network of state-care and boarding school facilities¹⁸ capable of accommodating children of almost all age groups. These state-run facilities are fortified with various security measures, in which Uyghur children are exposed to intensive Mandarin and Han-culture education, a systematic state-directed accelerated assimilation, which has been highly praised by the state propaganda whereby the children are the beneficiaries of family separation. The regime also has a comprehensive contingency plan regarding the socio-economic and psychological impacts of family separation, while the public schools are required to follow up on the children of the interned, staving off potential incidents. Moreover, relatives and family members are under the state’s watchful eye. Some documents show that many children under state care have one or both parents incarcerated in some form of mass internment.

By May 2019, there had already been at least tens of thousands of Uyghur children in state-run boarding schools, while they can be held under “state care” on weekdays even after the internment camps release their parent(s), meaning that the Chinese state has more time to indoctrinate and sinicized the children than their parents have to pass down what constitutes as Uyghur identity: The Uyghur Language, Uyghur culture and traditions, and the Islamic faith. “This is almost certainly not coincidental, but a deliberate part of “breaking roots” and changing Turkic minority societies through coercive social re-engineering”, which as its long- term objective, the Chinese regime is on course to carry out “a targeted cultural genocide” (Zenz 2019c).

The Uyghur Transitional Justice Database has registered 43 children under 18 who are missing, detained in state-run orphanages, family separations with parents detained in camps / parents escaped abroad . The information sources are based on the testimony of the missing children's parents or other relatives. The table below represents an overview of the missing children’s birth of year and gender distribution.

¹⁸ The construction of this massive network of state care was completed in late 2017, three years ahead of the originally set deadline as the new Communist Party chief Chen Quanguo was transferred to East Turkistan in 2016.

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Birth of year	Gender		Total
	Male	Female	
2017	2	1	3
2016	0	4	4
2015	3	2	5
2014	8	2	10
2012	1	1	2
2011	1	2	3
2010	2	1	3
2009	2	1	3
2008	0	1	1
2007	2	1	3
2006	0	2	2
2005	1	1	2
2003	1	1	2
Total	23	20	43

Table 3: Gender distribution of missing children under 18, based on birth of year

The table below represents the missing children's current whereabouts

Current whereabouts	Number
State-run orphanage	2
Concentration camp	1
Left to grandparents (family separation)	8
Missing	26
Dead	1
Unknown	5
Total	43

Table 4: Distribution of missing children's current location

Muhlise Memetjan [age, sex]

Mamutjan Abdurehim is her father, Muhherrem Ablet is her mother, Hikmet Mamutjan is her brother. She was in Malaysia with her parents and brother, because her father was studying for a doctorate. Her mother lost her passport in Malaysia by accident. She was unable to apply for a new passport in Chinese Embassy in Malaysia. She returned with her mother and brother to Kashgar for passport renewal for her mother. Her mother got her passport updated in 2016. Due to the financial difficulties she was not able to leave China immediately.

Her mother was taken away in April 2017 by the police. Her brother and Muhlise are living with grandparents. Her father Mamutjan Abdurehim is waiting for them in Australia.

Ayishe Abduweli [age, sex]

Ayishe's father traveled to Turkey with his 5 children, Ayishe was left in China with her mother and brother planning to leave after their father. However, they could not manage it. Ayishe was taken away by local authorities.

This is the case of a minor child left alone, the family has 7 children and faced constant police harassment (for having multiple children, breaking family planning rules). The father was able to leave China with 5 older kids, his wife and two kids who were not able to get passports were left alone. The information source states that the mother is later taken to a concentration camp and 2 children are also taken by local authorities.

Rahmutulla Shirbaqi [age, sex]

According to Radio Free Asia, Rahmutullah Shirbaqi disappeared from his home in Qaraqash (Moyu) county's Zawa township on Dec. 21, while in the care of his grandfather, 78-year-old Matnury Mahsut, and grandmother, 68-year-old Mahtumhan Tursunniyaz. Shirbaqi's body was found three days later and authorities determined that he had drowned after plunging through ice covering a ditch in front of his house in Chokanjilgha village, where his grandparents had raised him since his parents were sent to the Bostankol Re-education Camp in the county seat a year earlier.

An officer at the Hotan prefecture police headquarters told RFA that she was not authorized to discuss Shirbaqi's case, while two officials from the prefectural government said they had heard a two-year-old boy had died, but were unsure of other details. (RFA 2019)

Uyghur Forced Labour

Forced labor, as it was slowly being rolled out since the summer of 2018, became the next chapter of the Chinese regime's efforts to subjugate a large swath of the Uyghur population. As one batch of "trainees" graduates from the mass internment "re-education" camps, there must be one batch of "trainees" in employment/work (结业一批就业一批), according to a leaked internal Chinese document.¹⁹ "Jutting out against desert dunes, the new industrial zones in Xinjiang are often surrounded by high walls, barbed wire and security cameras. Some are built near indoctrination camps and employ former inmates" (Buckley & Ramzy 2019).

Many previously interned had been released from the internment camps, only to find themselves held captive and trapped in various forms of forced labor (Zenz 2019d). As The New York Times reported back in 2018 that "[t]he inmates [from the mass internment camps] assigned to factories may have to stay for years" (Buckley & Ramzy 2018). In his research based on Chinese government documents, Zenz (2019d) yet again presents to the world the Chinese regime's relentless drive to erase Uyghur identity, which includes an amalgamation of forced labor, family separation, and social control over Uyghur families, while executing all these state-directed measures in the name of "poverty alleviation".

The forced labor program operates in parallel with the mass internment indoctrination camps (Buckley & Ramzy 2019).

Zenz (2019d) in his research has identified three major routes to forced labor through indoctrination (political indoctrination and thought reform on religiosity) by which the Chinese regime subjects a large swath of the Uyghur adult population as well as other Muslim minorities to forced labor with varying degrees of coercion: 1. With the highest coercion level, internees are released from internment camps and sent to forced labor in camp-adjacent factories or close-by industrial parks, and subsequently may then be sent to their home regions' forced labor factories; 2. Targeting mainly the general rural population, adults of working age who are able to work are first sent to centralized training programs that include thought reform and ideological indoctrination, and then to forced labor thereafter; 3. With arguably the most intrusive social re-engineering aim in mind, having the most detrimental impact on Uyghur society, accompanied by a form of involuntary labor with relatively weaker direct evidence of coercion than the two above mentioned, Communist Party

¹⁹ Item no. 20 in the operations manual for running the mass internment indoctrination camps in East Turkistan, available at <https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6558510/China-Cables-Telegram-English.pdf> (in English) or the original in Mandarin <https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6558509/China-Cables-Telegram-Chinese.pdf>

work teams in villages “encourage” people (especially women) to take full-time factory jobs in various ways, while their children are placed in state-run child care facilities.

In spite of varying degrees of coercion, the overarching objective of the three above mentioned routes to forced labor is to serve ‘government social stability needs’ (政府出于维稳的需求) through thought reform and Communist Party ideological indoctrination, as it is indicated in various government documents (Zenz 2019d).

In the case of the third route to forced labor, the so called satellite factories in rural villages, like other forced labor factories elsewhere in East Turkistan, are likely to be equipped with high security features, such as fences, surveillance apparatus and metal detectors, according to what were previously publicly available advertisements to construction companies as well as procurement bids. Chinese regime’s “poverty alleviation” measure “promotes a significant degree of separation of children from their parents – at least during the work days” (ibid.). Almost all satellite factories in villages have day care centers where pre-school children can go to while their parents work at factories. Zenz (ibid.) argues that forced labor occurs in a state- controlled milieu, greatly reducing family interaction, thereby diminishing “intergenerational cultural, linguistic and religious transmission”.

According to a video reporting by The New York Times (Buckley & Ramzy 2019), many Uyghurs as well as other Muslim minorities (but mostly Uyghurs) have been sent to forced labor from the south of East Turkistan (e.g. Kashgar and Khotan), where most Uyghurs live, to mostly Han-Chinese populated north (e.g. Kuitun). “There is a great deal of pressure placed on individuals to sign work contracts. The threat of the camps hangs over everyone’s heads, so there is really no resistance to assigned factory work,” said Darren Byler, an expert on East Turkistan (ibid.). In the video, one worker says that he now only makes a third of what he used to, in comparison with his income back home in the south. One Kazakh worker named Erzhan confirms the exploitation by stating that “[he] worked on a production line for 53 days, earning 300 yuan (\$40) in total” (Byler 2019c). “The goal of the internment factories is to turn Kazakhs and Uyghurs into a docile yet productive lumpen class — one without the social welfare afforded the rights-bearing working class” (ibid.).

“Government documents blatantly boast about the fact that the labor supply from the vast internment camp network has been attracting many Chinese companies to set up production in Xinjiang [i.e. East Turkistan], supporting the economic growth goals of the BRI [the Belt and Road Initiative]” (Zenz 2019d). While in eastern China where fewer people want menial low- skilled factory jobs, East Turkistan offers not only government subsidies and generous tax breaks but also inexpensive labor (Buckley & Ramzy 2019).

According to a recent report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (Xu et al. 2020), in the period 2017 to 2019, more than 80000 Uyghurs had been transferred out of East Turkistan to China proper, assigned to many different factories via the Chinese government's labor transfer program called 'Xinjiang Aid' (援疆).²⁰ The report has identified 27 factories across 9 Chinese provinces that have been using Uyghur forced labor, manufacturing products for 83 global brands, including Apple, Nike²¹, Gap and Sony. The relocated Uyghur workers cannot opt out easily as this labor transfer program is closely linked to the Chinese regime's mass internment drive in East Turkistan, where defiance highly likely would send them to one of the internment camps.

On July 19, 2020 another exposé by The New York Times revealed that Uyghur forced labor was used, through the controversial state-directed labor transfer program (also known as the "poverty alleviation" program), by a number of Chinese companies manufacturing personal protective equipment (PPE) to meet both the growing domestic and global demand as the COVID-19 continues to run rampant worldwide.²² As of June 30, 2020 more than 17 companies out of the 51 in East Turkistan take part in the coercive labor transfer program. Moreover, The New York Times also traced and identified several other companies in China proper (e.g. Hubei province) that use Uyghur forced labor to produce PPE.

The UTJD has studied data from the the "Qaraqash List", a leaked document containing information about Uyghur detainees in the Bostan sub-district of Qaraqash county, Hotan prefecture, collected between 2017 and 2019, includes information about the social, religious and familial circles of detainees. The document also lists reasons for internment, and this includes "religious extremist thought infection", "wore veil/wife wore veil/had beard:", "going on a Hajj", "visiting Saudi Arabia", "studying religion," etc. The UTJD found several people connected to forced labour, several people on the Qaraqash list was noted was "sent out for labor transfer" (疆内外出务工). The table below presents some representative information connected to forced labour.

²⁰ Sending young Uyghurs away to work in China proper can change their mind-set and distance them from religious extremism, according to one local government report, <https://archive.ph/FN4bt> (in Mandarin).

²¹ The Washington Post reports on a Nike shoe factory supplier tainted with Uyghur forced labor, see at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-compels-uyghurs-to-work-in-shoe-factory-that-supplies-nike/2020/02/28/ebddf5f4-57b2-11ea-8efd-0f904bdd8057_story.html

²² A video investigation where "China Is Using Uighur Labor to Produce Face Masks", updated Aug. 13, 2020. <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/19/world/asia/china-mask-forced-labor.html>

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Name	Gender	Date of birth	Information source	Detail
Abduweli Rozimemet	Male	17.05.1996	Qaraqash list	Abduweli is a family member of a detainee from the Qaraqash list, the list states that Abdusalam is sent to a labour transfer program
Zuhre Abduheber	Female	07.07.1995	Qaraqash list	Zohre is a family member of a detainee from the Qaraqash list, the list states that Zohre and her husband are sent to a labour transfer program
Abdusalam Rozimemet	Male	01.06.1992	Qaraqash list	Abdusalam is a family member of a detainee from the Qaraqash list, the list states that Abdusalam is sent to a labour transfer program.

Table 5: General information of detainees in forced labour camps

The Chinese Regime's Genocidal Policy: Forced Contraception, Sterilization & Abortion

The Chinese regime is committing yet another crime against humanity that is the systematic Uyghur birth suppression, in addition to its mass internment drive in East Turkistan, while at the same time encouraging its Han majority population to have more children. Although this piece of breaking news based on solid evidence was reported by The Associated Press (2020) on June 29, 2020, the state-directed deliberate measures against the Uyghur population growth are nothing new to the Uyghurs, accounts of which circulated largely amongst the Uyghurs themselves. Uyghur women have been subjected to forced abortion along with forced sterilization since the mid-1990s, especially in the south of East Turkistan where most Uyghurs reside.

For instance, in Khotan the forced birth control and forced abortion have been the Chinese regime's persisted practices for many years prior to its mass internment drive (i.e. before 2016), where the local government demands all Uyghur women to have intrauterine contraceptive devices (IUDs) inserted after giving birth to their first child. Uyghur families would have to send an application to the local government in order to temporarily remove²³ the IUDs when they wish to have a second child. In villages, Uyghur women are almost always forced to have IUDs inserted after the first child, while in the cities, though may not be forced they²⁴ are threatened to lose their jobs if they bear a third child. Irrespective of where they live (in the villages or cities), Uyghur families must pay huge fines (compared to their income level) for having more than two children, where the third or the fourth child will often be stateless despite their parents having paid the fines. And in many other cases, Uyghur women who are civil servants or work in government sectors would be forced to undergo abortions for having more than two children.

The investigation of The Associated Press (2020) accompanied by the research of Dr. Adrian Zenz (2020a), based on a systematic analysis of Chinese government's statistical data and various primary source documents, have vindicated Uyghurs' anecdotal and personal accounts of forced contraception and forced abortions.

²³ The Chinese IUDs can only be removed surgically by state-approved practitioners, while all other unsanctioned removals will face prison terms and fines (Zenz 2020a, 14).

²⁴ Concerning at least the Uyghur civil servants and those in government sectors.

“The [Chinese] state regularly subjects minority women to pregnancy checks, and forces intrauterine devices, sterilization and even abortion on hundreds of thousands, the interviews and data show” (The Associated Press 2020). Beijing’s financial support for birth control had seen a dramatic effect in East Turkistan in the period 2015-2018²⁵, where the birth rates in the southern predominantly Uyghur cities of Khotan and Kashgar decreased by at least 60%, and in 2019 across East Turkistan, birth rates fell by almost 24%, whereas the national birth rates in China fell by only 4.2% (ibid.). The principle of equal treatment is absent under the Chinese rule in East Turkistan, in that Uyghurs and other minorities are punished in the abovementioned ways plus possible internment for having too many children (Zenz 2020a), while Han Chinese are not subjected to any of these, except for paying fines if caught. As a matter of fact, in Qaraqash (Karakash) county the most common reason for extrajudicial internment was having too many children, where 149 out of 484 camp internees were incarcerated for this very reason, according to a leaked government document (Zenz 2020b; The Associated Press 2020).

After being sent to the internment camps, Uyghur women are subjected to forced IUDs, forced intake of birth control pills, and forced contraceptive injection, while some that managed to flee the country later found out that they became sterile (The Associated Press 2020; Nikkei Asian Review 2019). Former camp internees also recounted cases of forced abortion transpired in the internment camps, where they were told that they would undergo abortions if tested positive after pregnancy checks (The Associated Press 2020).

Since 2017 the regime started to crack down on illegal births, seeking to punish prior violations dating back to as early as the 1990s, resulting in a dramatic surge in the number of prosecutions in birth-control related violations, accompanied by extrajudicial internment at least in the case of three counties²⁶ (Zenz 2020a, 10-11). Minority counties often imposed double punishments: first prosecuted birth control violations, then forced the violators to undergo IUD insertions or sterilization procedures (ibid., 12).

In 2014, the number of women who had undergone IUD insertion in East Turkistan was over 200,000; however, this number spiked to 330,000 (i.e. around 65 percent increase) in 2018, in sheer contrast to elsewhere in China as more and more women started removing the IUDs (The Associated Press 2020).

²⁵ In the same time period, East Turkistan witnessed 7.8 times more IUD insertions (minus removals) per capita than the national average in China (Zenz 2020a, 14).

²⁶ 1) Qiemo County in Bayingol Prefecture mandates long-term contraception as well as internment as punishment for those violators; 2) In its 2019 birth control policy, Nilka County in Ili prefecture would send away those who refuse to terminate their illegal pregnancies to extrajudicial internment camps; 3) In its early 2018 directive, Qapqal County in Ili Prefecture would also send the violators who refuse to pay the fines to the internment camps.

According to government birth control data, between spring 2017 and fall 2018 nearly 74% of married women in 12 rural and urban areas of K k Gumb z District had IUD insertions, half of them only had one child; in 2018, 80%²⁷ of all net IUD insertions (minus the removals) in China occurred in East Turkistan, despite the latter accounting for just 1.8% of China’s population (Zenz 2020a, 14).

By 2019 more than 80% of women of childbearing age in four minority prefectures in southern East Turkistan were to be subjected to involuntary long-acting contraception (Zenz 2020a, 12-13). Through family planning, the regional government in Kizilsu Prefecture is aiming at a bare 1.05‰ (i.e. 1.05 per mille/thousand) birth rate target for the year 2020 (ibid., 9).²⁸ It is worth noting that IUDs cause severe pain and discomfort, even regular vaginal bleeding, and those who managed to have them removed after years of discomfort likely became sterile as the IUDs punctured their wombs (RFA 2020c).

In the past, sterilization procedures in East Turkistan were not carried out in a large-scale manner. Beginning in late 2017 many local family planning documents demonstrate the Chinese regime’s efforts to offer free sterilization procedures and also set official targets. In 2018, 1.1% of all married women in East Turkistan had been sterilized (Zenz 2020a, 17). As indicated in official documents, 34.3% of all married women in Khotan and 14.1% in Guma County were planned to be sterilized in 2019, with ample government funding that continued into 2020 (ibid.). In 2018, the local government launched the “free birth control surgery” campaign, intending to subject the rural populations to mass sterilization, with ample funding to performance hundreds of thousands of tubal ligation²⁹ sterilization procedures (ibid., 2; 15). Zenz (ibid., 18) notes that, based on official primary sources³⁰, it is likely that the state-directed mass sterilization of women with three or more children is taking place.

Here is a case of one Uyghur woman who had been subjected to tubal ligation sterilization. The former camp internee Zumrat Dawut had been incarcerated for over two months in 2018, whose ordeal could have lasted much longer had

²⁷ This percentage was at 2.5% in the year 2014.

²⁸ To put it in perspective, the natural population growth rates in 2018 and 2019 in Kizilsu were 19.66‰ and 8.18‰ respectively. Zenz (2020a, 10) notes that the growth rate in 2018 was way below the anticipated official target, which was not only due to the regime’s mass internment drive, but also the increasingly sterner birth control measures.

²⁹ A surgical procedure in which both fallopian tubes are either blocked/tied or cut, and in the case of Uyghur women, the tubes are usually cut under the auspices of Chinese government, making it much harder to undo (RFA 2020c).

³⁰ For example, one government spreadsheet is titled “Family Planning in Southern East Turkistan’s (Xinjiang) Four Regions and Prefectures—Situation of Families’ Implementation of the Tubal Ligation Sterilization Measure” (南疆四地州计划生育家庭落实结扎措施情况表) (Zenz 2020a, 18).

her husband not pressed Pakistani diplomats, according to a Washington Post report (Rauhala & Fifield 2019). Upon her release, she was forced to renounce her religion and not to speak about what happened in the camp by signing documents; in addition, she had to pay a sum of \$2,500 for having three, not two children. Subsequently, she was offered a free sterilization procedure by the Chinese government, while still in a terrified and vulnerable state, she could not say no for fear of further internment. On October 22, 2018 she underwent an irreversible surgical sterilization.

State-directed forced abortions also transpire in East Turkistan, where the Chinese regime commands the hospitals to carry out forced abortions and infanticides, according to a piece of reportage by Radio Free Asia (RFA 2020c) in August 2020. The Chinese family planning policy allows two children for Uyghurs and other minorities who reside in cities, while for the minorities in the countryside three children. Hasiyet Abdulla, worked as an obstetrician in multiple hospitals in East Turkistan over 15-year span, said that between births there must be a waiting period of at least three years, meaning that Uyghur women must wait at least three years to have another baby after giving birth to their first child. The strict enforcement of this birth control policy has led to many abortions, including late-term abortions and in some cases infanticides (i.e. the killings of full-term newborns), where those in the maternity wards were simply following orders.³¹ “They wouldn’t give the baby to the parents— they kill the babies when they’re born,” Abdulla said.

Every hospital runs a family planning unit in East Turkistan, not only keeping track of all pregnancies and supervising IUD insertions, but also monitoring pregnant women for possible birth control violations, such as the rule of at least three-year time gap between births. The state-affiliated news outlet Ürümchi News Online reported that the former leader of the family planning unit Chen Yanchun, at the Women and Children’s Hospital in the capital city of Ürümchi, stated that there occurs an average of 30 or an upper limit of around 60 forced abortions at the hospital (RFA 2020c).

Shahide Yarmuhemmet, a Uyghur woman who worked at a local family planning office in Ürümchi’s New City District (新市区) between 1996 to 2011, confirmed the veracities of Abdulla’s account. She said that the heavy-handed enforcement of the family planning policy is upheld at every administrative level both in cities and the countryside, where violations are met with forced abortions; moreover, an application is required of a couple wishing to have a child.

³¹ Hospitals are forced to follow the Communist Party orders, pursuant to the widely distributed official documents. Noncompliance will lead to fines, thus the hospitals comply, according to Abdulla (RFA 2020c).

Radio Free Asia has documented forced abortions in East Turkistan dating back to at least 2005, and in a recent interview with a Uyghur woman named Bumeryem who currently lives in Turkey, it was revealed that she was subjected to forced abortion back in 2004 when she was 5 months pregnant with her fourth child, stating that “[i]f my baby who was aborted were alive today, he’d be 15 years old” (ibid.). In the recovery room Bumeryem met other women who also underwent forced abortions at different stages of pregnancy, including full-term. Expressions of discontent over the past few decades regarding the family planning policy have been deliberately associated with “separatism” and “extremism” by the Chinese regime.

Not long after the publication of Zenz’s research (Zenz 2020a)³² on the systematic Uyghur birth suppression, the local Communist Party officials in Suydung township, situated in Ili prefecture’s Qorghas county, warned local residents about possible visits from both Chinese and foreign inspectors that they could face fines or be sent to internment camps if they tell the truth about the family planning policies (RFA 2020d). A local police officer as well as a neighborhood committee chief confirmed to Radio Free Asia about this series of prep work, which involved instructing local residents in how to answer the questions concerning the family planning policies and internment camps, if asked whether they have IUDs inserted, they should say no (ibid.).

³² Zenz’s research was first published on June 28, 2020 and updated on July 21 the same year.

Witness statements on Forced sterilization

Zumret Dawud

“I am married to a Pakistani man and I am a mother of 3 children. On 31 March 2018, I was called by a local authority in China, I was taken to a long interrogation about my travels abroad, money that I sent to Pakistan, and phone calls I received from foreign countries. During the interrogation, I was tortured, I underwent medical tests in the military hospital where I saw many other Uighur females waiting for their turn.

The police officers brought me to a concentration camp after the medical test, that was my first day in the camp. I was tortured in the camp ... after spending 3 month in the camp, I was released because of my Pakistani husband's tireless searching campaign in Urumqi and protest in the Pakistani Embassy in Beijing. I was under the supervision of the so-called Chinese relatives appointed by a local authority.

In November 2018, I was forcibly sterilized at a military hospital, this was the condition that my husband could stay with me in Urumqi. During one of the flag raising ceremonies, the officials asked mothers who had more than two children to stay after the ceremony, and the others could leave. We had to register our third child (as this was generally not allowed in China) and, I was told I had to pay a fine of 18000RMB for my third child. I was told this was not a fine but was for educational purposes. So, I paid the fine. Around November 2018, at another flag raising ceremony, the authorities again asked mothers who had more than two children to stay after the ceremony. The authorities read out a direct order that a list of around 200 mothers had to be sterilised, and my name was on that list.

I received an order from the authorities to go to the hospital on my own (without my husband). On 2 or 3 November 2018, a police car collected me (together with four other women) and took us to the hospital. I was terrified. I was not given any information about the operation. At one point, I was given anaesthetic and lost consciousness. When I came to my senses, I felt a lot of pain. After I started complaining, the nurse gave me a shot. I was told that I had to wait two hours before being able to leave the hospital. After that, I was taken home. And after that, I had to take anti-inflammatory medicine for seven days.”

Mihrigul Tursun

“My name is Mihrigul Tursun and I was born in 1989 in Cherchen County, in Southern Xinjiang. I enrolled in December 2011 in the British University in Egypt to study business administration in Arabic, where I met my husband. In March 2015, I gave birth to healthy triplets, two boys and a girl, who are Egyptian citizens. It was difficult taking care of my three babies and my parents insisted I came back, so on 13th May 2015 I left for China with my three two-month-old triplets to seek help from my parents.

On 13 May 2015 I landed in Urumqi. I was taken to a room for questioning and my babies were taken away from me. The authorities repeatedly asked me who I met and talked to in Egypt. They then handcuffed me, scotch taped my mouth, placed a black hood over my head. As they pushed me when I was getting in the police car, my nose broke and I lost a lot of blood. They took me to the basement of a detention centre.

One day in July, I was told that I had been paroled because my children were sick. They told me that I could stay with them until they got better but warned me that I was still under investigation. They kept my passport, ID card and mobile phone. I went straight to the hospital to see my children. My oldest son was in an emergency care facility and I could only see him through a glass window. I was not allowed to go near him. The next day, the doctors told me that my son was dead. They said he died due to health complications and they gave me his dead body. I noticed that all my three babies had been operated on in their neck area while I was in prison. I was told they had been fed through a tube which went through their neck since they could not eat. I did not understand this.

I was detained respectively for two times and finally sent to the camp. I have witnessed the terrible happenings, the daily life of detainees inside the camp. I was tortured, humiliated, harassed during the interrogation. In April 2018, she was released by the authority to bring my children to Egypt and promised by signing a bunch of documents to return to China. I did not know where my family members were. I was unable to say goodbye to my family. On 28 April 2018, I landed in Cairo.”

Qalbinur Sidiq

“I am Qalbinur Sidik, from Urumqi, East Turkestan and I am a victim of China’s concentration camp.

May 5th was my birthday and I turned 50 on May 5th of 2019. On May 20th, I was informed by a young lady (government official) that I have to go to the hospital to get sterilized. Upon hearing it, I was shocked and almost dropped

my phone to the ground. I told her that I have just turned to 50 and I am willing to meet any other requirements, but I cannot do this one. However, I was rejected, they told me there's no way I could escape from this procedure.

I was asked to go to a doctor called Chang Le Yuan. When I arrived at the hospital I saw lines of people waiting to get called. When it was my turn, I entered a room where there was a physician and a nurse. That physician was relatively older. Seeing her I thought retired doctors must have been recalled for this scheme or he was really working there, maybe. I don't know.

Get on the bed, said the physician. I did. The physician started to say " it is not painful at all, you will not feel the pain. It is different from planting UID, it may hurt a bit, but you really don't feel it. I was not as detailed as this in my other attestation. So, I had to lie down on the bed. I was given IV, and injection. I don't know how long that process took, a half hour or one hour, I really don't know. Done, you can get up now, they told me. But I could not stand up because I felt very dizzy. I was feeling dizzy, I told them, it is because you lost lots of blood, they said without any concern. But they stamped on my paper that I got sterilized.

Recalling that now, I don't really know how I got home on that day after taking a taxi. I have somehow lost myself. I locked myself at home and did not go outside. I needed to recover quickly because I should leave to visit my daughter within a week. This caused much trouble for me. After getting the paperwork about my sterilization, I submitted it to that young lady. It proved that I had done a good job in meeting the government's demand. Thus, I was able to get my passport on September 15th, 2019."

Methodology

Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities who fled East Turkistan reside in various corners of the globe, which makes the data procurement process a challenging task. We decided to gather most of our data through our online platform³³. In addition to this online multilingual platform, individuals may also contact us directly through popular mobile communication apps, phone calls, or by email. By utilizing the abovementioned means of communication, we hope to reach out to as many victims as possible. Moreover, there had been some dedicated trips³⁴ completed by our project manager to some European countries to accommodate those victims who were not able to provide testimonies via our online solutions; in other words, we conducted a number of face-to-face interviews with them.

Our online platform is called Uyghur Transitional Justice Database (UTJD), whose primary objective is to procure testimonies and other relevant data with respect to the ongoing genocidal policies of the Chinese regime. We take strict measures to safeguard our data, which are stored in our offline database. Despite the fact that the Chinese regime holds a stranglehold on information flow within the country, we strive to verify the identities of the individuals and the veracity of the submitted information about the disappeared and the extrajudicially interned in East Turkistan. Furthermore, we also take the precaution of protecting the identities of the informants/testifiers, preventing potential cases of individually-targeted reprisals from the Chinese regime against their family members or relatives back home in East Turkistan.

The data procurement process is challenging in that many testifiers themselves struggle to find out the basic information about the disappeared/interned: when, whereabouts, and the reason why. With this difficulty in mind, the UTJD has and continues to accommodate the testifiers, who have full access to their data, where the data can be removed and renewed as the situation unfolds.

Additionally, we assist the testifiers in producing audio and video testimonies. These testimonies are in turn published via our social media accounts, with English subtitles. In this case, we would seek consent before publishing the testimonies, and as a matter of course, testifiers can withdraw their consent at any time. Those who for some reason cannot provide testimonies via our digital solutions, face-to-face interviews may be conducted. Data previously procured upon consent for public use may be shared among other human rights organizations as well as various governmental institutions, such as the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances.

³³ <https://www.utjd.org/>

³⁴ Due to COVID-19 pandemic some trips were postponed.

Open Source Information

We gather information that is publicly available on various social media platforms, which initially would be labeled as unconfirmed. Many testifiers make use of social media to post their testimonies. The testimonies are usually given by family members, friends or colleagues. We will try to get into contact with the person in question and confirm the existence of the testimony. Subsequently, the status of the collected data will be changed to confirmed. The next step is to verify the veracity of the data collected, which is challenging in and of itself due to China's stranglehold on information flow in East Turkistan, firmly held by the Chinese regime.

Media Reportage & The Leaked Government Records and Documents

We also make use of the extensive reportage carried out by various credible news outlets, both on-the-ground reporting and their investigative journalism. The data collection of this sort is mostly categorized as confirmed/verified.

UTJD Online Registration Forms

Any individual who is affected by the massive network of internment camps in East Turkistan can give testimony by visiting the UTJD and fill out various forms, which are available in different languages that are commonly used by the Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples in East Turkistan and neighboring Central Asian countries. The forms consist of the most essential items of information that in turn would contribute to a meaningful data analysis, and yet at the same time not requiring all fields to be filled out by the testifiers. Our team will contact the person in question and inquire for further information in order to confirm and verify the data provided.

Telecommunications

Some interviews and data collection are carried out via Skype and telephone calls, which are a part of our testimony collection process. This data procurement method is more accurate in that we directly inquire into the testimony and thereby can label the data collected as confirmed/verified.

Face-to-Face Interviews

In order to accommodate a portion of the testifiers, we also travel to different countries in Europe to conduct face-to-face interviews. Additionally, we are open to cooperation with local volunteers who can conduct such interviews following our guidelines. Testifiers can choose to provide information in writing or digitally. In addition, we assist testifiers in giving testimonies in audio or video formats. Our team will periodically plan such trips if needed, but that depends on our resources.

Data Collection on Paper

Due to the increasing harassment in various forms carried out by the Chinese regime as well as its digital surveillance threats, many Uyghurs in the diaspora communities are afraid to give testimonies using our online solutions. Therefore, testimonies may also be given on paper.

Satellite data

As strong scientific data in Land use/ land cover studies, high-resolution satellite images have been used in many fields of monitoring studies (Satellite data used as main data source in more than 100000 published scientific papers every year). Google Earth and HERE WeGo (<https://wego.here.com>) have many high-resolution satellite images. In this study, images from these platforms were used for Geo-locating and extracting additional information (e.g., Area, number of detention buildings, construction design and physical security measures of the facility, etc.) of each detention facility in East Turkistan.

A total of 32 key pieces of information were extracted from high-resolution satellite images. These evidential information will be combined with other additional information collected from different sources, used for documenting each detention facility.

No one is safe: an analysis based on the Uyghur Transitional Justice Database

The following analysis is based on the data provided by the Uyghur Transitional Justice Database, based in Norway. Basic composition of our dataset on internees is as follows:

542 or 21.8% are female, 1934 or 78.1% are male (2476 online data in total)

243 or 15.4% are female, 1,337 or 84.6% are male, 13 unclear (1,593 in total)

Profession	Male	Female	Total
Actor/Actress	12	6	18
Architect	2	0	2
Astronomer	0	1	1
Writer	12	3	15
Bricklayer	1	0	1
Butcher	3	0	3
Carpenter	2	0	2
Chef/Cook	7	1	8
Designer	8	1	9
Doctor	22	4	26
Engineer	11	1	13
Factory worker	0	2	2
Farmer	62	27	89
Gardener	3	0	3

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Hairdresser	4	0	4
Journalist	6	2	8
Lawyer	2	1	3
Lecturer	4	3	7
Librarian	0	2	2
Mechanic	1	0	1
Nurse	0	5	5
Pharmacist	2	0	2
Photographer	2	0	2
Police	6	4	10
Real estate agent	1	0	1
Scientist	1	0	1
Secretary	2	0	2
Tailor	2	5	7
Driver	6	0	6
Teacher	76	22	98
Translator	0	1	1
Law employee	4	1	5
Linguist	4	0	4
Student	100	14	114
Researcher	11	10	21
Professor	16	3	19
Editor	39	6	45
Poet	12	2	14
Bookkeeper	2	6	8
Businessman	109	9	118
Religious person	30	0	30
Sportsman	3	1	4
Craftsman	2	0	2
Webmaster	5	0	5

Civil worker	24	6	30
Retired	0	1	1
House wife	0	20	20
Unknown	1313	372	1685
Total	1934	542	2476

Table 6: Occupational distribution of the interned

Educational background of the interned is as follow

Educational background	Number
Professor	19
Phd	21
Master's Degree	15
Bachelor's Degree	265
Junior College for Professional Training (大专)	19
High school	125
Middle school	156
Primary school	107
No education	13
Total	740

Table 7: Educational background of the interned

As illustrated in the above tables, 296 have either primary/middle school education or no education at all, while over 320 have a university degree. However, it may not be a representative sample since the educational background is known for only 1/3 of the entire dataset.

Regional distribution of the interned is as follow:

City	Number registered
Aksu	115
Atush	37

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Bortala	2
Ili	125
Khoten	142
Korla	47
Karamay	11
Kashgar	283
Qumul	16
Sanji	2
Tarbagatay	1
Turpan	10
Urumqi	42
Unknown	1538
Total	2371

Table 8: Regional distribution of the interned

In our collected data, only 1/3 of the internees' place of internment was known, and given that the sampling of this dataset is not random, it may not represent the overall geographical internment pattern across East Turkistan. Some cities might have a higher representation simply because more data was collected concerning that city's internees, which could be attributed to better communication, or maybe other confounding factors.

Conclusion

Given our limited resources in the course of our data procurement process as well as China's stranglehold on information flow in general, there is a degree of insufficiency in our dataset. Having acknowledged that, our analysis nevertheless reflects much of what is already known about the Chinese regime's mass internment drive. China refers to its internment camps in East Turkistan as "re-education" centers, but based on the known educational background info for 1/3 of our entire sample, more than 300 internees have a university degree, which speaks volumes to the falsehood of the regime's internment campaign.

The average age of the internees in our dataset is 39, which demonstrates that the majority of them would not normally be enrolled in such "job training" programs. The release rate of the internees is at markedly low 4.6%. The Chinese regime also targets Uyghur religiosity in its internment campaign, but based on the known religiosity data point (i.e. only available for 1/3 of the dataset), 95 internees were registered as non-religious or not practicing, suggesting that the target population also includes those whose religious thoughts do not have to be "re- educated".

The overarching goal of all China-based states since the late Qing period has been to integrate East Turkistan to the rest of China, though this intent to control East Turkistan had been interrupted multiple times. The oppression toward the Uyghurs and other minorities, as discussed in the present report, has followed the ideological vicissitudes of the China-based regimes. While under Xi's rule, this oppression toward the autochthonous peoples of East Turkistan has intensified to a previously unrivaled magnitude.

Since 1949, the People's Republic China has, with varying degree of intensity, adopted various integrationist and repressive policies to assimilate the Uyghurs and other minorities into its Han-majority social fabric, whose impacts include state-directed Han immigration to East Turkistan; restrictions on religious freedom/activities (Bovingdon 2010, 129); the abolishment of the Uyghur language as the medium of instruction in schools and other educational institutions ((Dwyer 2005; Schluessel 2007; Byler 2019a); state failure to make any meaningful effort to outlaw employment discrimination against the Uyghurs (Becquelin 2004b); state exploitation of natural resources in East Turkistan where Uyghurs do not enjoy their share of the profit (ibid.); the widening wealth/income gap between Uyghurs and Han Chinese where the former have a lower living standard; indiscriminate random arrests and unfair trials (Amnesty International 2010); a general perception of social and spatial marginalization (Smith Finley 2011, 80); and the ongoing social-engineering of the whole Uyghur population, the aim of which is to erase the Uyghur identity.

The ongoing mass internment drive of the Chinese regime has shown that, among other things, the Uyghurs have been subjected to forced detention, ideological indoctrination, mass surveillance, forced labor, coercive family separation, forced contraception, forced sterilization, forced abortion, while their children are indoctrinated in state-run orphanages and brought up as Han Chinese.

So far only the United States has demonstrated that the systematic human rights violations against the Uyghurs and other minorities in East Turkistan have consequences: The United States Senate unanimously passed the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 and it became law on June 17, 2020; on July 9, 2020 the US imposed sanctions against the top Communist Party officials linked to the mass internment of Uyghurs, including Chen Quanguo, the Party chief in East Turkistan; A number of companies complicit in Uyghur forced labor have been put on the entity list; The Treasury Department imposed sanctions on the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (takes effect September 30, 2020), a powerful conglomerate of the Chinese regime in East Turkistan, which is also responsible for the continuous Han Chinese migration to East Turkistan since 1949.

The Chinese regime has engaged in severe human rights violations (crimes against humanity) that meet the criteria for genocide as defined by the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

The role of the collective and national consciousness, “which by its very nature, tends to emerge and re-emerge, however often and however harshly it is suppressed, in all peoples whose national identity is threatened by a ruling power” (Kanat 1986, 118).

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1 **12 September 2021 (0:14:25 – 1:17:55)**

2 **Muetter Iliquid**

3

4 MUETTER ILLIQUID – Thank you for inviting me again. I will focus on the UTJD's
5 methodology and satellite approach. I will start with the background. Since 1950s the
6 PRC has maintained an incarceration system involving forced labour, a vast network
7 of facilities. In 1994, in response to increased international criticism they ended this
8 system by changing the name from labour camps to prisons and for non-prisons to
9 community correction centres. In 2017 the NGO Human Rights Defenders found that
10 government arrests accounted for 21% all arrests in East Turkistan in China though it
11 is only 1.5% of the total population. Network of re-education camps are new modern
12 day gulags. China's entire labour system that was officially abolished in 2013. In the
13 past 4 years words like re-education, police surveillance, and forced labour have
14 become three main focuses for recent articles related to human rights abuses towards
15 Uyghurs in China. Chinese authorities initially denied the existence of camps and
16 forced labour, later describing them as vocational training centres, re-education
17 camps. The investigation's results show and collect more evidence and collection
18 more information. The objectives are: 1. To register the disappeared and extrajudicially
19 interned Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples in East Turkistan. 2. To present a
20 comprehensive dataset, shedding light on all known geo-located detention facilities
21 across East Turkistan. 3. To present a quantitative analysis of all known detention
22 facilities and an assessment on the spatio-temporal changes of different types of
23 detention facilities.

24 **The methodology:**

25 First of all we gather info publicly available information from social media platforms.
26 This type of information is labelled as unconfirmed, many testifies use social media to
27 post testimonies and carry out campaigns for family members and to raise awareness.
28 Usually given by family members, friends and colleagues. We try to get in touch with
29 them and try confirm existence of testimony and confirm. Then this status changes to
30 confirmed. The next step is to verify. This is challenging due to the PRC's information
31 control restrictions in East Turkistan. Then we make use of extensive reportage of
32 news outlets both on the ground and invest journalism and some leaked government
33 documents – Karakax, China Cables, construction tender notices – these are evidence
34 of Chinese government's notices of construction of camps – we combine with satellite
35 analysis. Then have the Shanghai list, the most leaked black list recourse of suspected
36 Uyghur terrorists, including children, more than 1 million in the database of Uyghur
37 terrorists. Contains data of all walks of life, children as young as 5, seniors over 80s,
38 Uyghurs who travelled abroad as well as those not been abroad. This is an example.
39 Then we use the UTJDs multilingual online registration forms. Uyghurs affected by a
40 massive network of internment camps. They can fill out forms, we have many
41 datapoints linked to datapoints. They include 'Chinese language proficiency',
42 'occupation', 'religiosity', etc... These are used for qualitative and quantitative
43 analyses. We have telecommunications. Some interviews via skype, telephone calls
44 are most convenient to person test, and inform of risks. They can do anonymously –
45 such as filling out a paper-based form. We suggest most secure channels for testifiers.
46 We then have face to face interviews. Representatives travel to different countries in
47 Europe to conducts face to face interviews. We cooperate with local Uyghur
48 communities in different countries through local volunteers.

49 In the end we go through a verification process, we label the data as confirmed or
50 verified. Confirmed means we have reached out to witness and asked for accuracy of
51 testimony by interview and building connection. Testimonies are also based on news
52 reports such as telephone interviews as Radio Free Asia also confirmed. Then as
53 verified, if the witness is able to provide documentary evidence for example, official
54 imprisonment or detention notice from police station, official notice from Chinese
55 embassies or consulates. Such type as usually given to Uyghurs abroad, actively
56 searching for missing family members, we also identify detainees through state-run
57 Chinese media. In this case it is usually the diaspora community who come to us to
58 report testifying. We have status updates via the Working Group on Enforced
59 Disappearances from the UN. This working group serves as a channel for
60 communication between family and other sources. We verify based on the status
61 updates. We can only verify when the testifier comes to us and confirms the database.

62 We are now on part two: Satellite imagery analysis. I will present the approach and
63 the analysis regarding detention facilities and estimation of overall capacity. The first
64 thing we do is search for evidential information related to the detention facilities. Since
65 2018 we have collected various kinds of evidential information relating to China's mass
66 detention of Uyghurs and other Turkic people, categorised into 6 categories – witness
67 testimony, news reports, and research articles, Chinese government official
68 documents, ground truth and videos, popular map searches and satellite data. Based
69 on sources. Datas sources is how it looks. Any information in these categories is
70 considered initiation threat to detention. We link all to each other and build fact based
71 databased.

72 I will go through table one by one. Some of our satellite findings are from witness
73 testimonies, which are usually video or written by camp survivors or employees. They

74 can provide corroborative evidence on facilities, construction design, detainees
75 number estimate, cell size, colour of uniforms. This is Omar Bekali, this is a camp we
76 identified based on his statement in Karamay city. This is Quelbinur Sedik, a former
77 camp teacher, in Urumqi in March-Dec 2017. The same applies to Tursunary
78 Ziawaden. Also rely on some news reportage and research articles. Usually also on
79 independent or research unit such as ASPI, Adrian Zenz. Radio Free Asia, retrievable
80 data points some first-hand information some visited facilities in person. Then we also
81 rely on Chinese government official documents, like China Cables, Qaraqash list, and
82 tender notices. Retrievable data points include detention location, data, size, facility,
83 official name and detention. The temporal range refers to 2016-2019 because from
84 2020 it has been hard to get documents from the Chinese government as the
85 information restriction flow. Then we rely on some ground truth pictures and videos
86 taken by media outlets. The datapoints will be the facilities official names and security
87 features. Here we see the re-education camp, taken from short video published by the
88 Los Angeles Times in 2009. The camp was converted and repurposed from Hongyan
89 garment factory. We can see a watch tower and guard and see two policemen running
90 over. Here is another example, video published by the Wall Street Journal. Again, we
91 can see a watchtower in front of the building. The video – based on popular map
92 services, 360, Baydou, officially recognised by the Chinese government, Baydou
93 provides restriction only from 2015-2016. Datapoints include location information and
94 names, addresses, etc. The last category is satellite data: Imagery taken from google
95 earth and ArcGIS World. Temporal ranges 2002-2021. This application provides high
96 resolution satellite imagery for geolocation and continues monitoring. We collected
97 15,000 more satellite high resolution images, more than 30 pieces key evidence of
98 existence of detention facilities. Without diving too deep into the table, based on the

99 characteristics listed on left hand side we can distinguish between diff incarceration
100 type – re-education, prison, pre-trial, Laogai prison farms. This is how they look like
101 visual image. Happy to answer questions later.

102 Our next methodology is to assess the security level of various incarceration types.
103 The main sec features of various types are visible in the satellite images and security
104 level is determined of sum of values given. Each security feature is given a value
105 shown, and it values accordingly. Take a look at watchtower value of 3, as only
106 appears in high security detention facilities and army bases. High mast lighting values
107 1 as it is a common feature in high security detention facilities, government entities
108 and sports centres. The security level is equal to the sum of values given to various
109 security features detectable in satellite images and can be divided into four levels, A,
110 B, C, D – if between 8-13 this is incarceration type with high security. If between 6-7 it
111 is high security, etc. We have evaluated each locations veracity whether re-education
112 camp or not based on security level and cross checking between various sources and
113 datapoint have registered 234 re-education camps. In total highly confident on 191 of
114 them, low confidence on 34 of them, for 9 we have insufficient data. We have
115 estimated overall detention capacity based on two types of mass calculations. The first
116 is on cell number, second on room size. In first case estimation of overall capacity is
117 equal to total number of cells times detainees per cell. We get the result as shown on
118 table beside. Overall capacity between 1,608,000, to 2,016,000 for prisons can find on
119 table. Second type of estimation is on detention cell size – equal total area of detention
120 cells – get overall capacity of detention facilities 1,374,000. Again, will come to this
121 later. We have documented 234 re-education camps and 357 prisons, pre-trial, 87
122 Laogai prisons. This is a prison city on outskirts of Bashegim City, 2nd division. It is

123 under control of Xinjiang construction corps'. The next one here is prison city on
124 outskirts of Aqsu city, and another on outskirts of Hotan.

125 This is the output result. A well-documented facility has around 60 data points, covered
126 by subtitles of table 11. Key evidence, security level and features, camp statistics and
127 estimation of capacity, other strategic facilities, fact-checking and expert assessment.
128 Our overall findings, we have found 67 camps that have very high security level, like
129 prisons. A total of 147 camps have forced labour factories inside or near the camps,
130 we suspect they are related or connected to forced labour. At least 31 re-education
131 camps satellite imagery show visible detainees in orange, blue or red uniformed. At
132 least 5 of the re-education camps are repurposed from former hospitals or health
133 centres. At least 42 camps are next to anatomic laboratories which may be connected
134 to forced organ harvesting. At least 42 have crematorium within 10km. From Radio
135 Free Asia have confirmed 2 crem in Aksu. A total of 56 camps are built next to pre-
136 trial or admin detention centres. It is more convenient to transfer from re-education
137 camps to detention centres. 147 prisons or detention centres are newly built or
138 expanded between 2017-2020 and the old and small ones were demolished. Some of
139 the security features of the 217 re-education camps have been removed starting from
140 April 2019. We believe this is due to increase international pressure on the Chinese
141 government as more evidence is evolved. This is the end of my presentation.

142 *COUNSEL – Can you confirm these data points are all location in Xinjiang?*

143 MI – Yes.

144 *COUNSEL – Concentration camps, you call them re-education camps, what specific
145 features make this different from the others?*

146 MI – We do identify four types of incarceration based on their location. We distinguish
147 four types based on security features, construction design, construction repurposed
148 time, size facility location, changes made to international pressure and visibility of
149 detainees on satellite images. If we look at security features, second on table. Re-
150 education camps have equipped passages between buildings. The watch towers are
151 square-shaped. There are fences around the buildings. For prisons and pre-trial
152 detention centres, they have the same security features. The watchtowers are round
153 shaped, there are fences inside or out the wall. For Laogai prison farms, they do have
154 both round and square watch towers. We found out some identifiable security features
155 were mostly removed and this is from spring 2019. For prisons all security features
156 are in use and the expansion are going on and for pre-trial detention. We believe this
157 is because China believes this is the judicially recognised facility and they are not very
158 afraid of these incarceration types being revealed. The Laogai systems, the majority
159 of them were abolished in 1994. When there were strong criticisms against them at
160 the time. We found out most are converted into prisons and not fully abolished.
161 Visibilities of detainees, for re-education camps detainees can be identified via
162 satellite. We can identify them in more than 40 camps whose uniforms are in red or
163 blue. This is not the case for the rest of the incarceration types.

164 *COUNSEL – The numbers you refer to 1,370,000, over 2.3 million people – This is the*
165 *capacity rather than the actual numbers?*

166 MI – Yes this is the capacity, not the actual number of detainees, we believe these
167 buildings can fit in 1,800,000-2,000,000.

168 *PANEL – I'd like to ask a few about your methodology. The first question is about*
169 *capacity. In your first slide you refer to a massive network – when you use that phrase*
170 *do you mean that both in terms of size and how extensive they are they are massive?*

171 MI – We have started this research a year ago, within a year we have found and
172 identified 234 camps, there is only one expert and therefore massive in a sense means
173 there is huge detention facilities built starting from 2017. We can see from the satellite
174 images that they are extending, the expansion of this camps starting from 2018 we
175 can see forced labour camps built next to the re-education camps. The newly built
176 re-education camps were built next to factories located in different cities.

177 *PANEL – What is the difference between confirmed and verified?*

178 MI – Confirming the evidence, a first example is social media - if we have gathered
179 testimony from social media, first label as unconfirmed. After reaching out and
180 interviewing that person we will literally ask personal background questions when they
181 left their region and last connected with their family members, and relations to
182 detainees. After detailed in reviewed this is confirmed existence of the testimony. In
183 other cases, we do refer to the telephone interviews conducted by Radio Free Asia
184 where they call to governmental institutions – this would also be confirmed. Verified is
185 a little bit different, it means if they can provide documentary evidence on their
186 testimony, such as a notice of imprisonment which can be from a certain police station
187 saying someone has come to pay their debt. If they can provide this kind of data they
188 will be labelled as verified. Letters by Chinese embassies can be labelled as verified
189 – it refers to the detainees of family members abroad. Gulbahar Jelilova's relatives in
190 Kazakhstan received a lot of letters telling them about her situation. Some other cases
191 refer to UN working group on enforced disappearance. We have a registration form in

192 the database and testifiers can register an account and detailed account of their
193 missing family members. We have a different team working on translation – when this
194 is done, we will send it to the UN Working Group on Enforced Disappearances, and
195 they will work on locating them. If the testifier comes back with more information, it will
196 come back as verified.

197 *PANEL – It is constantly changing; you can move people between the two?*

198 MI – Yes.

199 *PANEL – How quickly can buildings can be repurposed?*

200 MI – That is not my area of expertise.

201 *PANEL – Have you seen a repurposing happening in real time in this data here?*

202 MI - I am not the satellite expert on this, sorry.

203 *PANEL – You have given us great idea of satellite imagery can you give us a sense
204 of how this might look on the ground, are they in densely populated areas, how visible
205 might they be to those who caught sight?*

206 MI – Most of the re-education camps and prisons and other type of facility are located
207 on the outskirts of the cities. It is therefore not visible to the general public to figure out
208 places on their own without any detailed check. We do have some pictures and
209 readings that are issued by different leaders' panels. We can see those facilities are
210 on the outskirts, most have watch towers and police guards can see people coming.
211 They can detect them far away. It is not very visible.

212 *PANEL – Could you show us that slide?*

213 MI – Yes. We can see that there is around the mountain and we can now see some
214 other type of city construction around this facility. We can see watch tower and marked
215 as red, and another watch tower next to the main building. This is a camp located in
216 Urumqi which is also a bit outside Urumqi. This was repurposed from a garbage
217 factory.

218 *PANEL – A facility of this size needs personnel. Can you give us a sense of coming
219 and goings, what are the transport links to the facility, how is that done?*

220 MI - I can refer to the testimonies of former camp detainees which rely on ... mentioned
221 that from the detention centre there will be taken to a car and minibus and driven there.
222 They will have their heads covered by a black hood not to detect the roads and where
223 it is located. Lately we have found that there are .. taken to forced labour factories and
224 do not go out from the main entrance but from two passages so they will not be visible
225 on satellites.

226 *PANEL – And the personnel? Do they come and go? Are they resident?*

227 MI – No, it varies accordingly. Some detainees are kept in these camps for at least
228 three months, in other cases 10-18. The time periods vary accordingly. We do not
229 know how this is defined.

230 *PANEL – The supporting personnel, are they going in and out on a daily basis?*

231 MI - I know one case when I interviewed a former camp detainee, her husband working
232 in a forced labour camp. She told me that her husband was allowed to come back but
233 also spent days continuously there. He worked as a guard so not a detainee, he was
234 employed there and allowed to come back and visit his family once a week. This is not
235 applicable to detainees or workers.

236 *PANEL – Did you have discussions in your team about alternative explanations for*
237 *what is going on in these camps?*

238 MI – Yes, because we do go through a cross check process and we do check the
239 location of the detention camps from Chinese map services. For some of the 234
240 camps we did find out that they are labelled as a camp on the Chinese map sources
241 with another name such as ‘Xinjiang vocational school’. Even if labelled as such we
242 can see facilities are equipped with high security facilities such as barbed fences and
243 watchtowers. We do go through this type of cross checking.

244 *PANEL – Often a room is overcrowded with your 2.3 million estimates, could it be*
245 *double that? Some are really crowded, so it is a low estimation?*

246 MI – Yes based on detainees itself, we have based it on the model camps which the
247 BBC visited, they had a dorm room with 8-9 beds, but according to the former camps
248 detainees most have explained there were 20-30-40 people in each cell. We did not
249 take such numbers and referred to the minimal estimation – which is 10-12 based on
250 model camps. It is important to note we have generalised this data to each detention
251 facility which we should not do. We have not considered the inside design of this
252 construction – e.g. How rooms are placed.

253 *PANEL – you said some were new camps. Can you see if they are differently*
254 *arranged? You haven’t got much information about the inside.*

255 MI - I can try explain from the first picture. We rely on satellite picture when the camp
256 is being built. We can see a corridor on the middle and cell rooms on the side – this
257 will be 16 cell rooms on each side and 32 on each floor, with four storey building, so
258 there are 128 cells in this building. We did not consider the other facilities which might
259 be in the building such as toilets, torture rooms or administrative room.

260 *PANEL – you mention possible of using camps for .. have you any more information*
261 *on that?*

262 MI – We suspect this might be involved in organ harvesting as we have found this is
263 only one case where a camp is next to a we do not have other evidence on that.
264 This is an ongoing project to get additional evidence in support of this theory.

265 *PANEL – We have re-education camps and detention camps. What do they call a*
266 *prison? There are four types of camp, re-education, ...*

267 MI – prison and also a pre-detention trial centre. These are different. From the satellite
268 images they look the same, equipped with same security features and how buildings
269 are constructed and cell rooms but this does not mean they refer to them with the
270 same terminology.

271 *PANEL – Do you know what proportion of facilities, have been identified as such by*
272 *two different sources?*


273 MI – We are highly confident on 191 re-education camps. For 31 of them we could see
274 visible detainees, in 16 of them has appeared from photos of people visiting and
275 carried out reportage on these facilities. There are 13 camps which are supported by
276 pictures, some videos began from media outlets and we do steps we found on social
277 media as well. Four of the camps are confirmed by witness testimonies. They have all
278 confirmed and identified the location based on the documents we have provided and
279 have gone through such a process. 18 of the facilities are cross checked by Chinese
280 government's official documents such as the Qaraqash list as some detention centres
281 are mentioned. The last one is 112 camps that could be supported by camp
282 development changes – when we find security measures removed from international
283 pressure, we confirmed this is a camp.

Uyghur Transitional Justice Database

Annual Report 2021

Muetter Iliqud

12. September 2021



1. Background

- 1) China's massive network of detention facilities and forced labor
- 2) Mass arrests in East Turkistan
- 3) "Re-education" camps and new form of forced labor
- 4) International responses to Chinese regime's mass internment drive
- 5) China's denial on the existence of "re-education" camps and forced labor

2. Objectives

- 1) To register the disappeared and extrajudicially interned Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples in East Turkistan.
- 1) To present a comprehensive dataset, shedding light on all known geo-located detention facilities across East Turkistan.
- 1) To present a quantitative analysis of all known detention facilities and an assessment on the spatio-temporal changes of different types of detention facilities.

3. Methodology

3.1 Open source information

- Information that is publicly available on various social media platforms
- Testimonies usually given by family members/relatives, friends or colleagues



3. Methodology

3.2 Media reportage & leaked official government documents

- Investigative reporting carried out by various news outlets
- Leaked government documents:
 - The Karakax* list (Zenz 2020)
 - China cables (ICIJ, 2019)
 - Construction bid/tender notices (Zenz, UTJD)
 - Shanghai List (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2021)

出境未归人员亲属送培学员

姓名	性别	民族	出生年月	身份证号	户籍地址	联系电话	电子邮箱	工作单位	备注
...
...
...
...

3. Methodology

3.3 UTJD’s multilingual online registration forms

The UTJD has many data points linked to the testimonies collected, e.g. ‘ethnicity’, ‘Chinese Language Proficiency’, ‘Occupation’, ‘Religiosity’ ... etc. These data points would enable us to carry out both qualitative and quantitative analyses.

3.4 Telecommunications

- Skype, telephone calls
- Messaging Apps like WhatsApp, Telegram, Signal



UTJD ئۇيغۇر ئەدلىيە ئارخىپ ئامبىرى

ئۇيغۇر ئەدلىيە ئارخىپ ئامبىرى

مەدەنىي نەزەرىيە دۆلەت

زىيانكەشلىككە ئۇچرىغۇچىنىڭ كىملىك ئۇچۇرى

كىشى نامى: _____ خانىسى: _____ ئەخەللىسى ياكى ئەللىسى: _____

جىنسى (Male): _____ ئەر _____ ئايال _____

يېشى: _____ تۇغۇلغان يىلى: _____ ئاي: _____ كۈن: _____

تۇغۇلغان يۇرتى: _____

زىيانكەشلىككە ئۇچرىغۇچىنىڭ خىتاي كىملىك نومۇرى: _____

زىيانكەشلىككە ئۇچرىغۇچىنىڭ پاسپورت نومۇرى: _____

زىيانكەشلىككە ئۇچرىغۇچىنىڭ رەسمىي

سۈرىتى بولسا بۇ بەرگە ئەۋەتىشىڭىز بولىدۇ.
 تېلپون: +47 99850702
 ۋاسىتە: +47 99850702
 ئېلخەت ئادرىسى: info@utjd.org

خاتىجىڭىز تۈرەت ئارقىلىق ئېلىكترونلۇق ئۇلۇغۇڭ.
 ئۇيغۇر ئەدلىيە ئارخىپ ئامبىرى ئارخىپلاشتۇرۇپ ئىزمىلاش ئور سەھىپىسى
<https://www.utjd.org/register/register/>
 جەدۋىلىنى قۇلدا ئېلىدۇرۇپ ئەۋەتىش ئادرىسى
info@utjd.org

1 - بەت

3. Methodology

3.5 Face-to-face interviews

- Travel to different countries in Europe to conduct face-to-face interviews
- Cooperations with local Uyghur communities (local volunteers would conform to our interview guidelines)



Credit: Bahtiyar Ømer

- **Confirmation & Verification of the Disappeared**

Regarded as confirmed:

- Reaching out to the testifiers regarding their testimonies
- Via interviews
- News reportage, e.g. Radio Free Asia Uyghur Service

Regarded as verified:

- Official Imprisonment/Detention notices, e.g. from local police stations
- Official notices from Chinese Embassies or Consulates
- Through videos/pics taken by the state-run Chinese media, e.g. CCTV national news channel
- Status updates via Working Group on Enforced Disappearances



**Documenting China's Mass "Re-Education Camps",
Prisons and Forced Labor Factories in East
Turkistan: Fact-Checking on their existence**

4. Data Sources and Methodology

4.1 Searching for evidential information related to the detention facilities

- Our data collection started in early 2018, procuring from all possible sources.
- All collected information is categorized into six categories: **Witness testimonies, News reports & research articles, Chinese government’s official documents, Ground truth pictures & videos, Popular map services, and Satellite data.**
- Any single piece of information from above-mentioned sources would establish the initial thread, upon which we try to interlink the additional info from all the categories in order to build a comprehensive piece of evidence.

4. Data Sources and Methodology

Table 1 Data sources and their descriptions

Data	Contents	Source	Temporal ranges	Retrievable data points
1. Witness testimonies	Video and written testimonies	UTJD, Xinjiang Victims Database, RFA	2017—2021	Facility location, facility design, estimate number of the detainees, cell size, number of the detainees per cell, uniform color, etc.
2. News reports and research articles	Research articles about China's "re-education" camp system, forced labor & investigative reporting about particular detention facilities	Various News outlets: such as RFA, Bitter Winter, BBC, CNN, BuzzFeed, The New York Times, etc. Research institutes, such as ASPI, and other researchers and journalists	2017—2021	By visiting a particular detention facility, on the ground investigative journalism can give us first hand information, such as location, pictures, videos and other often neglected details.
3. Chinese government's official documents	Xinjiang Papers, China Cables, The Karakax List, Construction bid/tender notices, court decision notices, etc.	International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, The New York Times, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), Chinese government official websites archived by Shawn zhang, Dr. Adrain zenz, ASPI, Xinjiang Victims Database and others.	2016—2019	We can collect data points such as detention facility location, construction dates, construction size, facilities' official names, detainee information, etc.
4. Other ground truth pictures and videos	pictures and videos related to the detention facility	Social Media	2017—2021	Facilities' official names and security features.
5. Popular map services	Maps & street view pictures (Location, labels)	Baidu Maps, Tencent Maps, 360 Maps and Google Maps	2015 or 2016	We can extract location information, local addresses, street view pictures and names of the locations.
6. Satellite data	Images	Google Earth, ArcGIS World Imagery and HERE WeGo	2002.3—2021.7	Compound area size, number of detention buildings, construction design and physical security measures of the facility, etc., can be extracted to identify the detention facilities and document their spatio-temporal changes. 25

4. Data Sources and Methodology

4.2 Identification of the detention facilities based on information sources and satellite observations

Table 2 Testimonies and sources

Data	Contents	Source	Temporal ranges	Retrieval data points
1. Witness testimonies	Videos and written testimonies	UTJD, Xinjiang Victims Database, RFA	2017—2021	Facility location, facility design, estimate number of the detainees, cell size, number of the detainees per cell, uniform color, etc.



He is taken to the Qaramay (Karamay) City pre-trial detention center 2017.4.17—2017.11.4, then detained in “re-education” camp, which located 700m away 2017.11.4—2017.11.24.



Pic. 1 Former detainees and detention facility

4. Data Sources and Methodology

4.2 Identification of the detention facilities based on information sources and satellite observations

Table 1 Testimonies and sources

Data	Contents	Source	Temporal ranges	Retrievable data points
1. Witness testimonies	Videos and written testimonies	UTJD, Xinjiang Victims Database, RFA	2017—2021	Facility location, facility design, estimate number of the detainees, cell size, number of the detainees in per cell, uniform color, etc.



She was forced to teach the language at a men’s camp known as Cang Fanggou between March and September 2017, as well as at a women’s camp at a former nursing home in the city’s Tugong district between September and October of that year. Sidik, who now lives in the Netherlands, estimates that the two camps held around 3,000 and 10,000 detainees, respectively.

Pic. 2 Former employee and detention facility

4. Data Sources and Methodology

4.2 Identification of the detention facilities based on information sources and satellite observations

Table 1 Testimonies and sources

Data	Contents	Source	Temporal ranges	Retrievable data points
1. Witness testimonies	Videos and written testimonies	UTJD, Xinjiang Victims Database, RFA	2017—2021	Facility location, facility design, estimate number of the detainees, cell size, number of the detainees in per cell, uniform color, etc.




She was detained to an “re-education” camp in Kunes county on April 11, 2017. After a month of detention, she was released. On March 10, 2018, she was again detained without reason, and released on Dec. 25, 2018.

Pic. 3 Former detainee and detention facility

4. Data Sources and Methodology

Table 3 News reports and research articles

Data	Contents	Source	Temporal ranges	Retrievable data points
2. News reports and research articles	Research articles about China’s “re-education” camp system, forced labor & investigative reporting about particular detention facilities	Various News outlets: such as RFA, Bitter Winter, BBC, CNN, BuzzFeed, The New York Times, etc. Research institutes, such as ASPI, and other researchers and journalists	2017—2021	By visiting a particular detention facility, on the ground investigative journalism can give us first hand information, such as location, pictures, videos and other often neglected details.




Pic. 4 Screenshots of some news and research articles related to the forced labor and “re-education” camps

4. Data Sources and Methodology

Table 4 China's official documents related to the detention

Data	Contents	Source	Temporal ranges	Retrievable data points
3. Chinese government's official documents	Xinjiang Papers, China Cables, The Karakax List, Tender notices, court decision notices, etc.	The New York Times, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), Chinese government official websites archived by Shawn zhang, Dr. Adrain zenz, ASPI, Xinjiang Victims Database and others.	2016—2019	detention facility location, construction dates, construction size, facilities' official names, detainee information, etc.



Pic. 5 Screenshots of some of the official documents and a construction bid notice

4. Data Sources and Methodology

Table 5 The ground truth pictures and videos

Data	Contents	Source	Temporal ranges	Retrievable data points
4. Other ground truth pictures and videos	pictures and videos related to the detention facility	(Social) Media	2017—2021	Facilities' official names and security features.




吐鲁市职业技能教育培训中心 / Turpan City Vocational Skills Education Training Center

Pic. 6 The ground truth pictures and videos published by outlets on social media platforms

4. Data Sources and Methodology

Table 5 The ground truth pictures and videos

Data	Contents	Source	Temporal ranges	Retrievable data points
4. Other ground truth pictures and videos	pictures and videos related to the detention facility	(Social) Media	2017—2021	Facilities' official names and security features.



Re-education Camp" in the Iwirghol District, Hami City. Re-purposed from the Hami City Center for Disease Control and Prevention & Hami Region Central Hospital Southern Suburb Branch.

Pic. 6 The ground truth pictures and videos published by outlets on social media platforms

4. Data Sources and Methodology

Table 5 The ground truth pictures and videos

Data	Contents	Source	Temporal ranges	Retrievable data points
4. Other ground truth pictures and videos	pictures and videos related to the detention facility	(Social) Media	2017—2021	Facilities' official names and security features.



"Re-education" Camp near the Chong kol (Hongyanchi Reservoir, 红雁池水库) in the Tangritagh District. Re-purposed from the Hongyan Garment Factory (红雁服装厂).

Pic. 6 The ground truth pictures and videos published by outlets on social media platforms

4. Data Sources and Methodology

Table 5 The ground truth pictures and videos

Data	Contents	Source	Temporal ranges	Retrievable data points
4. Other ground truth pictures and videos	pictures and videos related to the detention facility	(Social) Media	2017—2021	Facilities' official names and security features.



Pic. 6 The ground truth pictures and videos published by outlets on social media platforms

4. Data Sources and Methodology

Table 6 Popular map services and data descriptions

Data	Contents	Source	Temporal ranges	Retrievable data points
5. Popular map services	Maps & street view pictures (Location, labels)	Baidu Maps, Tencent Maps, 360 Maps and Google Maps	2015 — 2016	location information, local addresses, street view pictures and names of the locations.



Pic. 7 The location of a known “re-education” camp is shown on popular Map services.

4. Data Sources and Methodology

We managed to extract all possible data points to identify detention facilities & document their spatio-temporal changes.

Table 7 The satellite data and descriptions

Data	Contents	Source	Temporal ranges	Retrievable data points
6. Satellite data	Images	Google Earth, ArcGIS World Imagery and HERE WeGo	March, 2002—July, 2021	1) Geo-locating detention facilities; 2) Extracting key pieces of information, such as compound area, number of detention buildings, construction design and physical security measures of the facilities, etc., were extracted to identify the detention facilities and document their spatio-temporal changes.



Table 8 The number of satellite sites were used for geo-locating and monitoring detention facilities

	Google Earth	ArcGIS World Imagery	HERE WeGo
“Re-education” camps	More than 6000 sites	More than 40 sites	12 sites
Prisons, pre-trial detention centers, administrative detention centers	More than 7000 sites	More than 60 sites	18 sites
Laogai farm prisons or detention camps	More than 2500 sites	More than 20 sites	9 sites

4. Data Sources and Methodology

The detention facilities are categorized into four incarceration types based on their characteristics shown on the satellite imagery.

Table 9 Characteristics of detention facilities based on the satellite imagery


	“Re-education” camps	Prisons	Pre-trial / administrative detention centers	Laogai prison farms (or detention Camps)
Location	Newly built ones mostly located near or at the outskirts of the city. Repurposed ones are mostly located in the city.	Old ones located near or inside the city area. Newly built ones mostly located in desert area or on agricultural land, little bit far away from the city.	Old ones located near or in the city area. Newly built ones mostly located in desert area or on agricultural land, little bit far away from the city.	Mostly located in the agricultural fields in most Bingtuan (兵团) divisions of Xinjiang Production Construction Corps (XPCC).
Security features & Construction design	1)Steel tube passages between buildings; 2)square-shaped watchtowers; 3)Steel welded fences around buildings.	1) Roundly-shaped watchtowers; 2) Steel welded fences inside and outside of the exterior wall.	1) Roundly-shaped watchtowers; 2) Steel welded fences inside and outside of the exterior wall.	Both Roundly- shaped and square-shaped watchtowers.
Construction/repurposement time	Started from April, 2017.	Reconstructed, continuously maintained, and newly built in the course of 1950-2021.	Reconstructed, continuously maintained, and newly built in the course of 1950-2021.	Built in the period 1953-1994, some of them were converted to prisons since 1994.
Size & various facility sections	1)Large compound area; 2)Wide gap between exterior wall and detention buildings; 3) Tall buildings with many storeys; 4) Large parking lots; 5) Have forced labor factories inside or in the vicinity of the camps.	1)Large compound area; 2)Wide gap between exterior wall and detention buildings; 3)Tall buildings with many storeys; 4)Have forced labor factories; 5) Large administrative buildings and other service units.	1)Relatively small compound area; 2) Short distance from exterior wall to detention building; 3) Generally two or three-story buildings.	Fewer detention buildings.
Changes made in response to international pressure	1)The construction of new camps and the expansion of existing camps seemed to be put on hold; 2)Some identifiable security features seemed to be mostly removed, starting from the spring of 2019.	All security features still in use, the expansion and new constructions still going on.	All security features still in use, the expansion and new constructions still going on.	The majority of them seemed deserted, some of them were demolished or had been mostly inactive since 1994. The ones that turned into prisons have kept their security features.
Visibility of detainees on satellite images	Detainees can be identified via satellite images, and we have been able to identify detainees in more than 40 camps, whose uniforms were in red or blue.	Not visible/identifiable	Not visible/identifiable	Not visible/identifiable

4. Data Sources and Methodology



Pic 8. “re-education” camps, prisons, pre-trial / administrative detention centers and Laogai prison.




4. Data Sources and Methodology



Pic 9. Camp units & visible detainees on satellite images.

4. Data Sources and Methodology

4.2 Assessment on the security level of various incarceration types

Security features visible in the satellite images	Symbols	Value	Descriptions
High exterior wall & the number of walls (W_L)		[1, 2]	The number of walls (including interior and exterior steel welded fences of the exterior wall) from exterior wall to detention buildings with cells. If there are two walls, the value given would be 2.
Guardrooms (G_R)		1	A common feature built next to each gate and entrance to the detention dorm area, also present in some important government entities.
Watchtowers (W_T)		3	Appears in high security detention facilities and army bases. In general, they are built on or inside the exterior wall.
Barbed wire on the exterior wall (B_W)		2	
High-mast lighting (L_H)		1	
Steel welded fence (S_W)		2	
Steel tube passage (S_p)		2	

Security level (SL) = the sum of values given to various security features that are detectable in satellite images, which can be divided into four levels: A, B, C, and D.

$$SL = W_L + G_R + W_T + B_W + L_H + S_W + S_p$$

Security Level	Value range	Descriptions
If SL = {A}	$8 \leq A \leq 13$	then Very high
SL = {B}	$6 \leq B \leq 7$	High
SL = {C}	$4 \leq C \leq 5$	Medium
SL = {D}	$2 \leq D \leq 3$	Low

4. Data Sources and Methodology

4.3 Verification of the “re-education” camps

We have evaluated each location’s veracity, whether it is a “re-education” camp or not, based on the **security level** of the facility, cross-checking between various sources and data points (e.g., **investigative reporting, ground truth pictures and videos, witness testimonies** and the **Chinese government’s official documents, visibility of the detainees on satellite images, security feature changes over time**).

Table 10 Verification of the “re-education” camps

Expert Assessment	High confidence	Low confidence	Insufficient data
Security level	SL \geq 6 , = 186	4 \leq SL \leq 5 , = 34	2 \leq SL \leq 3 , = 9
Visibility of the detainees	Yes (31)	Not visible	Not visible
Media coverage & investigative reporting	Yes (16)	2	1
Ground truth pictures and videos	yes (13)	1	0
Witness testimonies	Yes (4)	0	0
Chinese government’s official documents	Yes (18)	0	0
Camp development changes (some security features were removed)	yes (112)	4	Unclear (8)
Total number of “re-education” camps	191 (81%)	34 (15%)	9 (4%)

4. Data Sources and Methodology

4.4 Estimation of the detention capacity

1) We estimated the detention capacity of each detention capacity based on the simple math as follows:

$$D_c = \text{Total number of detention cells} * \text{Detainees in per cell}$$

(Testimonies from former detainees and propaganda videos from Chinese state run media provide us some details about detainees in per cell).

2) We also estimated the detention capacity based on the detention cell size.

$$D_c = \text{Total area of detention cells. m}^2 / 2\text{m}^2$$




(the space for person when a detainee is lying down).

Overall capacity based on the detainees per cell:


“re-education” camps	= 1,680,000—2,016,000
Prisons	= 590,000—674,000
pre-trial / administrative detention centers	= 606,000—692,000
Laogai farm prisons	= 87,000—99,400

Overall capacity based on the detention cell size:

“re-education” camps	= 1,374,000
Prisons	= 422,000
pre-trial / administrative detention centers	= 486,000
Laogai farm prisons	= 76,000



Cell size




Pic. 8 Extracting detention cell size and counting cells.

Number of cells ⁴²

5. Output result


We have documented 234 “re-education” camps, 257 prisons & pretrial administrative detention centers, and 87 labor prisons (or farms (under city Camps)) in our database.



Pic.10 The geo-located incarceration types and Prison cities.

5. Output result


A prison city located out skirt of the Korla city.



Pic.10 The geo-located incarceration types and Prison cities.

5. Output result


A prison city located out skirt of the Bashegim City, XPCC (Bingtuan) 2nd Division.



Pic.10 The geo-located incarceration types and Prison cities.

5. Output result


A prison city located out skirt of the Aqsu city.



Pic.10 The geo-located incarceration types and Prison cities.

5. Output result

A prison city located out skirt of the Hotan city.



Pic.10 The geo-located incarceration types and Prison cities.

5. Output result

A well-documented detention facility has around 60 data points, which are covered by the subtitles of Table 11.

Table 11 The contents of each well-documented detention facility

Title	Subtitle
1. Overview	Internal Review and Observations
2. Key Evidence	2.1 Summary of Key Pieces of Evidence
	2.2 Camp Location and Surrounding Areas Shown in Popular Online Map Services (Baidu Maps, Tencent Maps, 360 Maps, Google Maps)
	2.3 Available Satellite Images for Monitoring Camp Compound
	2.4 Monitoring Changes on the Camp Compound Based On High-Resolution Satellite Images
	2.5 Visibility of the Detainees on Satellite Images
	2.6 Chinese Government's Official Documents Related to a Particular "Re-education" Camp
	2.7 Media Coverage of this Particular Camp & Investigative Reporting
	2.8 Ground Truth Data (Photos and Videos Taken on the Ground)
	2.9 Eyewitness Testimonies About a Camp
	2.10 Victims Disappeared into a Particular Camp
3. Security Level and Features	3.1 Watchtower status
	3.2 Guardroom Status
	3.3 Barbed Wire on the Exterior Wall
	3.4 Steel Welded Fences

5. Output result

A well-documented detention facility has around 60 data points, which are covered by the subtitles of Table 11.

Table 11 The contents of each well-documented detention facility

Title	Subtitle
3. Security Level and Features	3.5 Steel tube passage between buildings
	3.6 High Mast Lighting
	3.7 The High exterior wall & Layers of the Walls from the Detention Buildings with Cells
	3.8 Camp Security Level
1. 4. Camp Statistics & Estimation of Detention Capacity	4.1 The Area of the Compound
	4.2 The Parking Lot
	4.3 Expansion of the Compound Area
	4.4 The Detention Buildings with Cells
	4.5 Number of Detention Cells
	4.6 Total Area of Detention Cells
	4.7 Detention Capacity of the Camp
5. Other Strategic Facilities Closely Related to the Camp	5.1 Forced Labor Factory
	5.2 Enterprise and its main Business
	5.3 Other Neighbouring Facilities
6. Fact-Checking & Expert Assessment	
7. Acknowledgement	Contributor (visiting the camp and providing first-hand evidential documents, geo-locating, searching for evidence other than satellite images, analysis, and reporting)

5. Overall Findings

- 1) We have found 67 camps that have very high security level, like prisons.
- 2) A total of 147 camps have forced labor factories inside or near the camps.
- 3) At least 31 “re-education” camps’ satellite imagery show visible detainees.
- 4) At least 5 of the “re-education” camps are repurposed either from the former hospitals or health centers.
- 5) At least 42 camps have funeral parlor / crematorium located within 10 km.
- 6) A total of 56 camps were built right next to the pre-trial or administrative detention centers.
- 7) A total of 147 prisons or detention (pre-trial or administrative) centers were newly built or expanded during 2017-2020. Very old and Very small 9 detention (pre-trial or administrative) centers were demolished.
- 8) Some of the security features (e.g. watchtowers of 62 camps, barbed wires on the exterior walls, steel welded fences around the building) of 217 “re-education” camps have been removed, starting from April of 2019.

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